beings that we designate as ἐπιστήμη, as θεωρεῖν. Even beings with which I negotiate, not in the sense of concern but in the sense of setting forth facts in the way that they are, are initially there in a δόξα. From there, Aristotle consciously refers back to the history of philosophy. He initially reviews every fundamental problem with regard to the way one thought about it, on the basis of the positive understanding of the fact that the matter must have somehow come into view in such a δόξα. Indeed, δόξα is the characteristic trust in that which shows itself initially. And that which shows itself initially is the basis of the investigation of the matter itself.
e) Δόξα as the Basis of Theoretical Negotiating
α. Pre-given (πρότασις) and Project (πρόβλημα) as From-Which and About-Which of Theoretical Negotiating (Topics Α4 and Α10–11)
In order to see precisely that δόξα also controls theoretical λέγειν, λόγος in the sense of the “treatment” of something, of theoretical explication and thorough consideration as opposed to practical negotiating, such as a trial—“treating” in the sense of διαλέγεσθαι, the way that one speaks about a matter—the aim of accomplishing something by its means has to be abandoned; λέγειν itself is that which is now of concern. In order to see this basic meaning of δόξα, I briefly refer to what is set in opposition in Book 1 of the Topics (which deals with διαλέγεσθαι), where Aristotle shows quite clearly the types of λόγοι that arise from δόξα. He shows how it always has the character of δόξα, which I refer to as speaking, speaking-with-one-another. That is important because it is from here that the understanding of the συλλογισμός is to be obtained, as well as the understanding of logic. That there is a logic is not accidental, but must be understood on the basis of fully determinate basic phenomena of being-there itself.
In Chapter 4, Book 1 of the Topics, Aristotle shows “that with regard to which everything, according to its measure and according to how it is structured and from where,” discourse and speaking-with-one-another arises in διαλέγεσθαι.129 ἔστι δ’ ἀριθμῷ ἴσα καὶ τὰ αὑτά ἐξ ὧν τε οἱ λόγοι καὶ περὶ ὧν οἱ συλλογισμοί. γίνονται μὲν γὰρ οἱ λόγοι ἐκ τῶν προτάσεων· περὶ ὧν δὲ οἱ συλλογισμοί, τὰ προβλήματα ἐστι.130 “The where-from, on the basis of which discourse is, and that about which there is discourse, are numerically equal and the same. That about which there is discourse are the προβλήματα, that on the basis of which discourse is, the πρότασις.” In accordance with what is presupposed, it must be shown that both of these phenomena themselves arise from δόξα, that they are ἔνδοξα, expressings that stand in some sort of connection with δόξα, that come out of δόξα and maintain themselves in relation to it.
129. Top. Α 4, 101 b 12: πρὸς πόσα καὶ ποῖα καὶ ἐκ τίνων οἱ λόγοι.
130. Top. Α 4, 101 b 13 sqq.