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The Interpretation of the Being-There of Human Beings [156–158]


sense of a ground. Rather, Aristotle designates the πρόβλημα as θεώρημα,141 “something to be examined,” that which is to be the object of speaking. The question-character of the πρότασις is such that it requests agreement, while θεώρημα means something whose investigation is to be carried out in negotiations. It is something that is συντεῖνον ἢ πρὸς αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγήν, “that is subject to being grasped, that I either resolve to or renounce,” ἢ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν καὶ γνῶσιν, “that something is uncovered and brought to knowledge.”142 It becomes something opened up, encountered in the discussion; and what is raised in discussion has, in itself, the claim to be discussed. The relation of πρόβλημα to ἔνδοξον: it is something opened up in such a way that no agreement between them occurs. περὶ οὗ ἢ οὐδετέρως δοξάζουσιν ἢ ἐναντίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἢ οἱ σοφοὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἢ ἑκάτεροι αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς,143 “with regard to them, there is no aspect from which one came to a determinate view; according to its character, it is open in a way that is debatable, or it is such that with regard to them the many think otherwise than those who understand, or with regard to them they are in disagreement with each other.” What is to be investigated has the character of the debatable. A particular form of the πρόβλημα is the θέσις. Not every πρόβλημα is θέσις, but every θέσις is πρόβλημα. θέσις δέ ἐστιν ὑπόληψις παράδοξος τῶν γνωρίμων τινὸς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν,144 “a taking-for [ὑπόληψις is another word for δόξα], the—παράδοξος—next to, outside of, stands next to δόξα.” Such a ὑπόληψις is not an arbitrary particular case that anyone would have thought up, for it belongs to δόξα as constitutive of the possessor. Θέσις is a δόξα such that “the one who has it belongs to those who are entrusted with φιλοσοφία,” in the sphere of those who deal with the genuine consideration of beings. Κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν: a view opened up by one who concretely moves in the region of research—φιλοσοφία in opposition to sophistry. οἷον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, καθάπερ ἔφη Ἀντισθένης· ἢ ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται καθ’ Ἡράκλειτον, ἢ ὅτι ἓν τὸ ὄν, καθάπερ Μέλισσός φησιν.145 “Such a θέσις is, for example, the δόξα of Antisthenes, in which there is no controversy [a δόξα παράδοξος. It goes against the average opinion, but is not proposed by just anybody, but rather by one who is familiar with the average opinion.] Another example is Heraclitus’s saying that everything is in motion, or Melissus’s saying ἓν τὸ ὄν.” These are not the ἐναντίον τοῦ τυχόντος,146 “of some arbitrary person,” but of someone who has investigated, of someone who has knowledge of the matter. Θέσις is distinguished from πρόβλημα by speaking explicitly against the dominant opinion, while there are many προβλήματα that do not speak against the dominant opinion in a pointed way. They are, however, debatable; they leave something open.



141. Top. Α 11, 104 b 1.

142. Top. Α 11, 104 b 1 sq.

143. Top. Α 11, 104 b 3 sqq.

144. Top. Α 11, 104 b 19 sq.

145. Top. Α 11, 104 b 21 sq.

146. Top. Α 11, 104 b 23 sq.


Martin Heidegger (GA 18) Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy

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