β. Inability-to-Get-Through (ἀπορία) as the Topic of Theoretical Negotiating
(Metaphysics Β1)
On the basis of the characterization of that from where and that about which διαλέγεσθαι speaks, we are to infer what can, in general, be a possible topic for negotiation. It allows its distinction from the discourse of rhetoric to stand out more precisely. Aristotle characterizes discourse, the topic of rhetoric, as τὰ ἤδη βουλεύεσθαι εἰωθότα;147 that which is treated in scientific discussion as τὰ λόγου δεόμενα,148 λόγος meant in the sense of διαλέγεσθαι. That which is dealt with in διαλέγεσθαι is such as to “require” (δέομαι) that speaking which has no further aim, which does not follow from the natural function of practical speaking. Here, λόγος is separated from the πρακτόν; λόγος has become πρᾶξις. Here, λόγος appears as negotiating in its pure function, as the exhibiting of that about which there is negotiation, with regard to how and what it is. Discussion proceeds with regard to what requires λόγος, and therefore what is not clear without qualification, what is not brought to intelligibility in another way, what cannot be imparted in another way. A λόγου δεόμενον is not simply the matter of a “reprimand” (κολάσεως) or of a “direct, simple perceiving.”149 “Those that have difficulties, whether honoring the gods or loving their parents, need to be reprimanded”;150 as we would say, they need a smack upside the head. Here, it would not make sense to undertake the writing of a treatise about “whether the snow is white or not”;151 here, it is simply a matter of opening one’s eyes.152 It is becoming clear, now, that a basic requirement of conversation is that one agree on the topic of conversation, whether the topic allows its concrete sense to be discussed, or whether the topic does not lies outside of all discussion. However, not just anything that requires a particular grounding, that is not settled by a reprimand or by direct perception, is a λόγου δεόμενον. οὐδὲ δὴ ὧν σύνεγγυς ἡ ἀπόδειξις, οὐδὲ ὧν λίαν πόρρω,153 “even that for which a proof is available, whose exhibiting can be easily put forward, and whose proof is all too remote,” is not a possible topic of such a conversation. That too has no aporia. It is more difficult than that which could be sufficient for the δύναμις of the conversation. The possible topic of διαλέγεσθαι is limited and indicated—the topic must have an aporia in itself.
Aristotle offers an extensive treatment of ἀπορία in Book 3, Chapter 1 of the Metaphysics. It must be kept in mind that ἀπορία makes its appearance in the context of λέγειν, of independent λόγος; not in a πρᾶξις, but rather that through
147. Rhet. Α 2, 1356 b 37 sq.: ἡ δὲ ῥητορικὴ ἐκ τῶν ἤδη βουλεύεσθαι εἰωθότων.
148. Rhet. Α 2, 1356 b 37: ἐκείνη μὲν ἐκ τῶν λόγου δεομένων.
149. Top. Α 11, 105 a 4 sq.: μὴ κολάσεως ἢ αἰσθήσεως.
150. Top. Α 11, 105 a 5 sqq.: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποροῦντες πότερον δεῖ τοὺς θεοὺς τιμᾶν καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς ἀγαπᾶν ἢ οὔ’ κολάσεως δέονται.
151. Top. Α 11, 105 a 7: πότερον ἡ χιὼν λευκὴ ἢ οὔ.
152. Ibid.: [δέονται] αἰσθήσεως.
153. Top. Α 11, 105 a 7 sq.