which λέγειν itself is πρᾶξις. In relation to ἀπορία, Aristotle is himself aware of a series of characteristic expressions. He speaks of ἀπορεῖν,154 εὐπορεῖν,155 διαπορεῖν,156 προαπορεῖν.157 Πορεῖν meant “running,” “going,” in the sense of λέγειν, in a discursive mode, λέγειν in the function of ἀποφαίνεσθαι. Ἀπορεῖν: “to not get through” in this being-in-progress, in running-through, in the course of this exhibiting. The α-privative shows that one must πορεῖν in general. To ἀπορία belongs πορεῖν, that one is in progress in general, that one maintains oneself in an exhibiting. The τέλος is εὐπορεῖν, getting-through-well. Ἀπορία is not itself a τέλος, but is at the service of a determinate getting-through; it is always the on-the-way to . . . , with regard to which one initially does not get through. The function of ἀπορεῖν is δηλοῦν in the mode in which one exhibits “knots” in the πρᾶγμα.158
Ἀπορεῖν is fulfilled in the way that one calls upon the prevalent opinions about a matter.159 Prevalent opinions should be thoroughly considered to see how far the matter is shown in them. Ἀπορία has the positive sense of disclosing the matter in advance according to determinate characteristics. Only when I have gone through a preliminary inability-to-get-through, specifically exhibiting where I have gotten through, do I genuinely possess the τέλος of the investigation. I can then decide, at the end of the investigation, whether or not I found what I was seeking.160
Ἀπορία has the sense of the cultivation of an interrogatory stance of scientific research. The cultivation of the interrogatory stance means nothing other than fixing the matter that is spoken about according to basic determinations, leading the questioning in definite directions. The classic example of this is Book 1, Chapters 2–9 of the Physics, in which Aristotle goes through the aporias of beings with regard to their being-in-motion. The matter itself becomes ever more visible in going-through. The corresponding aporias of being qua being, as the possible topic of a science, are found in Metaphysics, Book 2, Chapters 1–6. The basic presupposition is that one gains an orientation from a definite fundamental experience of the matter. Only, then, if I already have the matter in a legitimate way, can I venture to approach aporias. This is not a seizing of arbitrary difficulties and contradictions. Ἀπορία is the way to cultivate actual questioning with the possible aim of εὐπορεῖν.
154. Met. Β 1, 995 a 25.
155. Met. Β 1, 995 a 27.
156. Met. Β 1, 995 a 28.
157. Met. Β 1, 995 b 2.
158. Met. Β 1, 995 a 29 sqq.: λύειν δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν. ἀλλ’ ἡ τῆς διανοίας ἀπορία δηλοῖ τοῦτο περὶ τοῦ πράγματος.
159. Met. Β 1, 995 a 25 sq.: ταῦτα δ’ ἐστίν ὅσα τε περὶ αὐτῶν ἄλλως ὑπειλήφασί τινες.
160. Met. Β 1, 995 a 33 sqq.: διὸ δεῖ τὰς δυσχερείας τεθεωρηκέναι πάσας πρότερον, τούτων τε χάριν καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ζητοῦντας ἄνευ τοῦ διαπορῆσαι πρῶτον ὁμοίους εἶναι τοῖς ποῖ δεῖ βαδίζειν ἀγνοοῦσι, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐδ’ εἴ ποτε τὸ ζητούμενον εὕρηκεν ἢ μὴ γιγνώσκειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλος τούτῳ μὲν οὐ δῆλον, τῷ δὲ προηπορηκότι δῆλον.