§16. ἦθος and πάθος as πίστεις (Rhetoric Β1, Nicomachean Ethics Β4)
a) Theoretical and Practical Negotiating
By contrast, the topic of everyday discourse in the assembly, before the court, and so on, is that “which always already habitually an object of deliberation,”161 about which one has conversed from old, in being-with-one-another in the πόλις. Because of this, there is a definite concrete orientation toward that which is the topic of conversation. Insofar as it concerns βουλεύεσθαι, concerns πρακτόν, and insofar as it concerns ἔνδοξον, insofar as there is discourse of general opinions in opposition to general views for the purpose of cultivating a definite view, this discoursing is not situated in the realm of διαλέγεσθαι. In this discoursing, concerned as it is with such objects, the speaker and the one who is spoken to are fundamentally important. In διαλέγεσθαι, on the other hand, it is to a certain degree a matter of indifference to whom it is spoken, and a matter of indifference who I am, how I operate therein. In speaking in the previously mentioned sense, the ἦθος of the speaker and the πάθος of the one spoken to, are relevant. For both of these determinations ground the manner and mode in which δόξα is possessed, the way in which he to whom the view is to be imparted stands with respect to the view. From the context of speaking-with-one-another, we must briefly come to an understanding of the ἦθος of the speaker and the πάθος of the hearers, that is, with respect to how the speaker and the addressee conduct themselves toward the δόξα of which there is speaking, and toward the δόξαι on whose basis there is speaking. From there, we will specifically select the πάθος of “fear,” of φόβος, treated in Chapter 5 of the second Book of the Rhetoric.
A basic determination of a topic of a conversation, namely that it is ἀπορίαν ἔχον, follows as a basic condition for the discussion of a problem that aims at the exhibiting of definite concrete contexts in what is spoken about and of which evidence is given. The aspect of ἀπορία is in itself related to a πορεῖν, “running”: speaking in the sense of exhibiting, being underway in exhibiting. Πορεῖν has for its aim εὐπορεῖν, “coming-through-in-the-right-manner” to that which is questioned. Accordingly, πορεῖν/ἀπορεῖν is a προαπορεῖν that forgoes in advance a εὐπορεῖν. In relation to λέγειν, it is δηλοῦν, “making manifest” that which is questioned. In relation to questioning itself, it is a mode of cultivating the question as such in the right way. Through the exhibiting of definite concrete characters of the matter in question, the end of examination becomes manifest, and through this it is possible to bring the examination onto the right track; and at the end of the examination it is possible to decide whether what is sought was found, whether what is set forth at the end of the examination is a concrete result. With Aristotle, ἀπορία is taken up and narrowed. That which
161. Rhet. Α 2, 1356 b 37 sq.: ἡ δὲ ῥητορικὴ ἐκ τῶν ἤδη βουλεύεσθαι εἰωθότων.