the one who is calmly attuned to something.”163 ἀλλ’ ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἕτερα ἢ κατὰ μέγεθος ἕτερα [φαίνεται].164 “The matter appears either completely differently or differently to a great extent.” τῷ μὲν γὰρ φιλοῦντι, περὶ οὗ ποιεῖται τὴν κρίσιν, ἢ οὐκ ἀδικεῖν ἢ μικρὰ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν, τῷ δὲ μισοῦντι τοὐναντίον.165 To the one who is already well-disposed toward another, this other person will appear either to be not at all at fault or only at fault in an insignificant way; conversely when someone has something against another, this other person will appear in just the opposite way.” To him it will be obvious that the person in question committed an offense. καὶ τῷ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντι καὶ εὐέλπιδι ὄντι, ἐὰν ᾖ τὸ ἐσόμενον ἡδύ, καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀγθὸν ἔσεσθαι φαίνεται, τῷ δ’ ἀπαθεῖ καὶ δυσχεραίνοντι τοὐναντίον.166 “And whoever is, from the outset, for a matter that is up for negotiation, who sympathizes with it, will take what should happen as what, in fact, will happen, and at the same time what is conducive [the optimist, as we say]. On the other hand, to the one who is indifferent and to the ill-humored pessimist, things appear, from the outset, in a different light”; and correspondingly he will also stand very differently in relation to deliberation.
b) ἦθος as πίστις
The ἦθος and πάθη are constitutive of λέγειν itself. First of all, we will consider ἦθος, the “comportment” of the speaker: in what manner the speaker offers himself to his hearers in discourse, how this offering of himself contributes to the cultivation of the πιθανόν, how this ἦθος acquires the possibility of cospeaking, of co-mattering. How is it with speaking that we as hearers take the speaker to be himself what bears witness to the matter that he represents? What is it about speaking that the speaker speaks for the matter with his person, leaving aside what he says, the concrete arguments that he has brought to bear on something?
As to the cultivation of ἦθος, there are three aspects that come into question: (1) φρόνησις, “looking around”—the speaker must appear to be someone who looks around in discourse itself; (2) ἀρετή, “seriousness,” transcribed earlier with σπουδαίως; (3) εὔνοια, “good attitude,” “good will.”167
163. Rhet. Β 1, 1377 b 21 sqq.: ἐπεὶ δὲ ἕνεκα κρίσεώς ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική [ . . . ], ἀνάγκη μὴ μόνον πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὁρᾶν, ὅπως ἀποδεικτικὸς ἔσται καὶ πιστός, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὑτὸν ποιόν τινα καὶ τὸν κριτὴν κατασκευάζειν· πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρει πρὸς πίστιν, μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς συμβουλαῖς, εἶτα καὶ ἐν ταῖς δίκαις, τό τε ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα καὶ τὸ πρὸς αὑτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν πως διακεῖσθαι αὐτόν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐὰν καὶ αὐτοὶ διακείμενοί πως τυγάνωσιν. τὸ μὲν οὖν ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα χρησιμώτερον εἰς τὰς συμβουλάς ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ διακεῖσθαι πως τὸν ἀκροατὴν εἰς τὰς δίκας· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ φαίνεται φιλοῦσι καὶ μισοῦσιν, οὐδ’ ὀργιζομένοις καὶ πράως ἔχουσιν.
164. Rhet. Β 1, 1378 a 1.
165. Rhet. Β 1, 1378 a 1 sqq.
166. Rhet. Β 1, 1378 a 3 sqq.
167. Rhet. Β 1, 1378 a 9.