will thus have real trust—he will himself be a πίστις in his λόγος.171
Aristotle considered the two aspects of φρόνησις and ἀρετή already in Chapter 9 of Book 1 of the Rhetoric.172 The third aspect, εὔνοια, is one that he treats in the context of analyzing the πάθη.
c) πάθος as πίστις
Πάθος, the second aspect that is a consideration for πίστις, is treated extensively by Aristotle in the subsequent chapters of Book 2. The expression πάθος has multiple meanings at the same time; it has fundamental significance within Aristotelian philosophy. We can list three basic meanings of this expression, and accordingly three concrete contexts that it designates: (1) the average, immediate meaning is that of “variable condition”; (2) a specifically ontological meaning, which is important for the understanding of κίνησις: πάθος in connection with πάσχειν, what one most often translates as “suffering”; (3) a resulting meaning: variable condition in relation to a definite concrete context, variable condition within a definite being-region of life: “passion.” Πάθος in this last sense is the topic of the Rhetoric and the Poetics.
At first, we will take up the last meaning and, at the same time, the proper context in which the phenomenon designated as πάθος is discussed. The context becomes visible in Chapter 4 of Book 2 of the Nicomachean Ethics. In this chapter, Aristotle begins the investigation into what ἀρετή genuinely is. The aim of the investigation into the being-character of ἀρετή has, for its immediate task, to set forth what in general ἀρετή is to be understood as, and out of which being-contexts it appears: γένεσις of ἀρετή. Aristotle introduces this investigation with a discussion that is important for us: ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστίν, πάθη δυνάμεις ἕξεις, τούτων ἄν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετή.173 Πάθος belongs, therefore, to that “which comes to be in the soul.” Ψυχή is the οὐσία of a ζῷον, it constitutes the being of those beings that are characterized as being-in-their-world. Thus it has being in three distinct modes of its coming to be: πάθη, δυνάμεις, ἕξεις.
λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος, and so on, “as a whole, the sort of thing with which ἡδονή and λύπη are co-given”174 a definite finding-oneself, “being-elevated,” “being-depressed.”
On the other hand, ἕξις is, at first, something which characterizes the manner and mode in which we are in such a πάθος.175 Ἕξις is that in relation to
171. Rhet. Β 1, 1378 a 15 sq.: ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸν ἅπαντα δοκοῦντα ταῦτ’ ἔχειν εἶναι τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις πιστόν.
172. Cf. Rhet. Α 9, 1366 a 23 sqq.
173. Eth. Nic. Β 4, 1105 b 19 sqq.
174. Eth. Nic. Β 4, 1105 b 21 sqq.: ὅλως οἷς ἕπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη.
175. Eth. Nic. Β 4, 1105 b 25 sq.: ἕξεις δὲ καθ’ ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς.