extent there is a προαιρεῖσθαι in them. This is not the place to explain these connections more precisely. I am merely pointing out that it would perhaps be in order if philosophers were resolved to reckon what it actually means to speak to others.
The second condition is the “disposition” of the hearer himself at each moment, which Aristotle sets down in writing as πάθος. Accordingly, among the tasks of rhetoric is that of setting forth the possible situations in which the hearer can find himself attuned, his frames of mind—setting forth these determinations with respect to their various aspects, in order to direct the speaker as to what is to be taken into consideration when he chooses the προαίρεσις. The Rhetoric’s analysis of the πάθη has this intention: to analyze the various possibilities of the hearer’s finding himself, in order to provide guides as to what must be cultivated on the part of the hearer himself.
The first determination: ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι’ ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις.179 (1) Μεταβάλλοντες: something along the way with respect to which “a change sets in for us,” through which “we change” from one disposition to another. (2) Combined with this change, διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις, we “differentiate ourselves” from ourselves before the change in that which is the hearer’s task: “to take a position,” “to form a view.” The formation of a view involves the manner and mode in which we change. (3) οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή:180 not “following,” but rather “co-given” in combination with the πάθη is a “being-disposed-as-higher-or-lower” of the being-there in question. These are the constitutive aspects, as set down by Aristotle with respect to the πάθη, given the special aim of analysis in the Rhetoric.
The manner and mode in which we are in a frame of mind also constitutes how we stand with repect to the matters, how we see them, how extensively and in what respects. Coming-out-of-one-definite-frame-of-mind-into-another relates primarily to the mode of taking-a-position toward the world, of beingin-the-world. Herein lies the possibility and danger of shifting relations. The right frame of mind is nothing other than being-in-the-world in the right way as having it at one’s disposal. The world, initially and for the most part, is there in πρᾶξις, with the character of ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως, and at the same time with the determinations of “more or less.” The world is there as ἀγαθόν or συμφέρον, and that as “more or less.” Thus our comportment toward it is also more or less; we comport ourselves by these degrees in a more or less average way, in order to operate in the world. The manner and mode of the perspicuousness of the world is more or less. For this reason, one understands that “coming into the genuine frame of mind” means: coming into the mean, coming from the aforementioned degrees into the mean. The mean is nothing other than the καιρός, the entirety of circumstances, the how, when, whither, and about which.
179. Rhet. Β 1, 1378 a 20 sq.
180. Rhet. Β 1, 1378 a 21 sq.