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κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ ὁρμὴν ἕκαστον.187 This concept, as constitutive for understanding the concept of movement, must be understood on the basis of this ἔχειν. Συνεχές, “continuum,” “constancy,” is a basic aspect of the being of things moved (Physics, Book 5).188
These four kinds of ἔχειν always mark beings with the being-character of being after a definite being-possibility, or its negation, which, in the case of negation, is the same as that of holding off something from being genuinely as it would like to be. It is no accident that Aristotle says in conclusion: καὶ τὸ ἔν τινι δὲ εἶναι ὁμοτρόπως λέγεται καὶ ἑπομένως τῷ ἔχειν.189 “Having is said in the same way as being-in-something.” Ἑπομένως: this meaning of being-in-something is already co-given with having; the character of having and being had as that of being-in-something.
Thus in this way it is justifiable when ἔχειν appears among the categories alongside κεῖσθαι. For its part, ἕξις is related to this ἔχειν, taken as a mode of being-there (Chapter 20): ἕξις δὲ λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον οἷον ἐνέργειά τις τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ ἐχομένου, ὥσπερ πρᾶξις τις ἢ κίνησις.190 Ἕξις is the ἐνέργεια, “the genuine there, the being-present of the having and of what is had.” The there is related to having, having as the having of what is having and of what is had. Within this being-context, ἕξις means the genuine being-present of having as such.
ὅταν γὰρ τὸ μὲν ποιῇ τὸ δὲ ποιῆται, ἔστι ποίησις μεταξύ· οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐσθῆτα καὶ τῆς ἐχομένης ἐσθῆτος ἔστι μεταξὺ ἕξις. ταύτην μὲν οὖν φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν τὴν ἕξιν· εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ βαδιεῖται εἰ τοῦ ἐχομένου ἔσται ἔχειν τὴν ἕξιν.191 “When the one does something, the other is done; thus the doing as such is the μεταξύ, the between. There is also a between in the case of having clothes on, having-on on the one side, the clothes that are put on on the other side.” The having-on as such is the ἕξις. This having is something ultimate, as nothing more can be had on its part. The having of this having is not a new being-determination, but rather simply the there, the being-present. In having on the clothing that is put on, it is genuinely there as put on. It is the same with the being-there of clothes. An article of clothing is not there when it is hanging in the closet, but when it is put on; it is in its τέλος. In being put on, the clothes are what constitutes the genuine there of the clothes, both put on and worn: the ἕξις.
Aristotle further characterizes this ἕξις as διάθεσις καθ’ ἣν ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς διάκειται τὸ διακείμενον, καὶ ἢ καθ’ αὑτὸ ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο, οἷον ἡ ὑγίεια ἕξις τις· Διάθεσις γάρ ἐστι τοιαύτη.192 In relation to the being-contexts that we are treating, διακεῖσθαι is related to μεταβάλλειν, which happens through the πάθη.
187. Met. Δ 23, 1023 a 21 sqq.
188. Cf. Phys. Ε 3, 226 b 18 sqq.
189. Met. Δ 23, 1023 a 23 sqq.
190. Met. Δ 20, 1022 b 4 sq.
191. Met. Δ 20, 1022 b 5 sqq.
192. Met. Δ 20, 1022 b 10 sqq.