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sense, then, πάθος designates the “size,” the “measure,” of that which happens to me, that which occurs to me in a harmful way. We have a corresponding expression for that: “that is a blow to me.”

From these four meanings, the genuine relatedness of πάθος becomes visible; it is related to the being of living things, which is characterized by a thus-finding-oneself-again-and-again. The occurring to one befalls and strikes one in this disposition. This occurring has in itself the character of the harmful. The occurring itself, as happening, does not need, without qualification, to have the character of the harmful, that of φθορά. Rather, Aristotle recognizes a μεταβολή, κίνησις, ἀλλοίωσις, in which πάσχειν has the character of σωτηρία.²⁴² Something occurs to me such that this experiencing or undergoing has the character of σῴζειν. By way of something encountering me, occurring to me, I am not annihilated, but instead I myself first come into the genuine state, namely, the possibility that was in me now becomes genuinely real. Hegel took the phenomenon of σῴζειν from Aristotle in the expression “sublation (Aufhebung).” I emphasize this here, so that the context, along with the phenomenon, of motion becomes clear. Aristotle touches on the distinction in a characteristic context: If one who has information about a definite matter, who is in possession of a knowing, actually presents the subject matter in question to himself on the basis of this knowing, of the being-composed, by being-able-to-see, to see the subject matter in person; then a particular κίνησις, a μεταβολή, is to be ascertained—a “reversing,” though one that cannot be properly designated as “becoming-otherwise.” Or if one wanted to designate it generally as “becoming-otherwise,” one must introduce a new γένος of ἀλλοίωσις. For it is not the case that a builder becomes another through building, when he builds a new house. Rather, he becomes precisely that which he is.²⁴³ As opposed to this μεταβολή through which the ἕξις is saved, is brought precisely to that which it should be, there is a kind of πάσχειν that has the character of στερητικόν. Something happens to me, by which I lose the ἕξις, for example, becoming-old. Πάθος is, therefore, that which deprives me of a matter, and a preserving, a saving—preserving in the sense of safekeeping, of raising to a higher, genuine being of ἐνέργεια.²⁴⁴

c) Πάθος as the Being-Taken of Human Being-There in Its

Full Bodily Being-in-the-World

Πάθος, in relation to the ζωὴ πρακτικὴ μετὰ λόγου, is thus a being-taken of being-there. Being-there is taken with that which is there in the world with

242. De an. Β 5, 417 b 2 sqq.: οὐκ ἔστι δ᾽ ἁπλοῦν οὐδὲ τὸ πάσχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν φθορά τις ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τὸ δὲ σωτηρία μᾶλλον τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος.

243. De an. Β 5, 417 b 5 sqq.: θεωροῦν γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ ἔχον τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὅπερ ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι [ . . . ] ἢ ἕτερον γένος ἀλλοιώσεως. Διὸ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν τὸ φρονοῦν, ὅταν φρονῇ, ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν οἰκοδόμον ὅταν οἰκοδομῇ.

244. De an. Β 5, 417 b 14 sqq.: δύο τρόπους εἶναι ἀλλοιώσεως, τὴν τε ἐπὶ τὰς στερητικὰς διαθέσεις μεταβολὴν καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰς ἕξεις καὶ τὴν φύσιν.