being-there itself—from without, but from without in the sense of the world as the wherein of my being. The possibilities and ways of its being-taken follow from being-there itself. Thus, this being-taken of being-there as being-in-its-world does not involve anything like what we could designate as the “spiritual,” which invites the conception of πάθος as affect. Instead, it is always a being-taken of beings as living things as such. Speaking precisely, I cannot say that the soul hopes, has fears, has pity; instead, I can only say that the human being hopes, is brave. τὸ δὴ λέγειν ὀργίζεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ὅμοιον κἂν εἴ τις λέγοι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑφαίνιεν ἢ οἰκοδομεῖν· βέλτιον γὰρ ἴσως μὴ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλεεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄνθρωρον τῇ ψυχῇ.245 “To say that the soul gets angry is the same as wanting to say that the soul builds a house. It would be better to say not that the soul has pity or learns or believes something, but that the human being does τῇ ψυχῇ.” Soul is here conceived as οὐσία, insofar as the being-taken of beings as living things is expressed in the πάθη. The topic that Aristotle refers to as Περὶ ψυχῆς, the ontology of beings, is precisely the human being. Therefore, the πάθη are not “psychic experiences,” are not “in consciousness,” but are a being-taken of human beings in their full being-in-the-world. That is expressed by the fact that the whole, the full occurrence-context, which is found in this happening, in being-taken, belongs to the πάθη. The so-called “bodily states” of anxiety, joy, and so forth, are not symptoms, but also belong to the characteristic being of beings, of human beings.
In Book 1, Chapter 1, of De Anima, Aristotle discusses the genuine object of such an investigation Περὶ ψυχῆς—the role played by the πάθη. Thus he discusses the πάθη along with the ways in which a living thing is taken: ἀπορίαν δ’ ἔχει καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς, πότερόν ἐστι πάντα κοινὰ καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἢ ἐστι τι καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον αὐτῆς· τοῦτο γὰρ λαβεῖν μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, οὐ ῥᾴδιον δέ. φαίνεται δέ τῶν μὲν πλείστων οὐθὲν ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος πάσχειν οὐδὲ ποιεῖν, οἷον ὀργίζεσθαι, θαρρεῖν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι. μάλιστα δ’ ἔοικεν ἴδιον τὸ νοεῖν· εἰ δ’ ἐστι καὶ τοῦτο φαντασία τις ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας, οὐκ ἐνδέχοιτ’ ἂν οὐδὲ τοῦτ’ ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι.246 Regarding the πάθη, he asks “whether they are all common to that which possesses them [to the ἄνθρωπος; here κοινά means all human beings], or if there are πάθη that are cut off from the soul. It is urgent that this be clarified [noteworthy use of λαβεῖν], but it is not easy. Most people [invocation of the average experience of human beings regarding being-there itself] believe that the body somehow takes part in all having-courage, and so on, and in all perceiving in general. [The expression αἰσθάνεσθαι—having-courage toward . . . , being-inclined, and so on—is not used in the narrow sense of perception, but as awareness in the sense of having-there of the world. It is not theoretical considering, but being-open for something that is around me.] To most, even νοεῖν seems to be an ἴδιον of the soul. [To most, pure considering—for example, pure mathematics—seems to
245. De an. Α 4, 408 b 11 sqq.
246. De an. Α 1, 403 a 3 sqq.