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The Interpretation of the Being-There of Human Beings [208–209]

of fearing without encountering something in the environing world that could be the direct occasion of fear. In this being-a-matter-of-concern of the πάθη, corporeality is co-encountered in some mode or other.

If that is the case, then the question is: in which field of investigation do beings with the character of living things belong? Is it not the φυσικός that also has the ψυχή as his topic? That is, in fact, the case to the extent that, fundamentally for the φυσικός, every σῶμα is a τοιοῦτον, determined thus and so, from which it follows that the φυσικός is obligated to determine this τοιοῦτον from the outset, to determine the ὕλη in its positive sense. And it is precisely this task of the basic determination of beings that the early φυσιολόγοι have left unheeded. We must approach this state of affairs from the opposite side, and show the extent to which the φυσικός must draw the ψυχή into consideration within certain limits. A reason for this digression is the context of the analysis of motion in Chapters 1–3 of Book 3 of the Physics.



§19. The φυσικός and His Manner of Treating ψυχή (De Part. An. Α 1)


How ψυχή in general came into view is evident from Book 1, Chapter I of the investigation Περὶ ζῴων μορίων—which is simultaneously a concrete example of the manner and mode in which Aristotle genuinely carries out theoretical λόγος. The treatise is called “On the Parts of Animals,” but not much can be gathered from it, taken in this way. It should be observed, however, that ζῷον is, here, taken in the broadest sense as “living thing.” Μόριον and μέρος have a much broader sense than simply “part,” in the sense of quantitative piece: μόριον also has the sense of “function,” “capacity,” “structural aspect.” The μέρη are all that constitutes the jointure, the being-joined, of a definite being. Περὶ ζῷων μορίων means: “On the Connection of Capacity and Jointure of Living Things as Determinate Beings.”

a) The Two Types of ἕξις θεωρίας: Concrete Knowledge (ἐπιστήμη)

and Assurance of the Manner of Treatment (παιδεία)

Aristotle begins the investigation with a fundamental deliberation as to the conditions of scientific research. We will, here, become acquainted with that which corresponds to what we learned in the discussion of ἀρετή. There, we defined ἀρετή as ἕξις προαιρετικὴ μετὰ λόγου, specifically as the φρόνιμος carries it out. Here, Aristotle points to the ἕξις θεωρίας, “the ability to have scientific research at one’s disposal.” He determines this ἕξις from two sides: (1) ἐπιστήμη and (2) παιδεία τις.

Ad 1. The first is concrete knowledge; concrete knowledge about a subject belongs to the very possibility of a researcher.

Ad 2. Much more decisive, and more essential for Aristotle, is παιδεία, the assurance of the manner of treatment.

Περὶ πᾶσαν θεωρίαν τε καὶ μέθοδον, ὁμοίως ταπεινοτέραν τε καὶ τιμιοτέραν,

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