uncovered, exhibited. The expression λόγος is taken with this ambiguity, for definite reasons, first, λόγος, λέγειν in the sense of accessing something and exhibiting its λόγος in the sense of access; λόγος also means what is expressed as such, the being that is addressed lies therein. In translating it as “address,” we are taking λόγος in this second sense. Even in German, the expression “addressing” [Ansprechen] is used with a definite meaning, as when we say of an instrument “it addresses” [er spricht an], “it answers,” “restores” in the sense of restoring something to its call. Λόγος in the sense of access: to exhibit a matter in such and such a way, to call it in such and such a way. In addressing, the matter thus called addresses; in exhibiting, it appears as it is. It depends on how a matter is called, so that it addresses itself from itself in the right mode. Λόγος taken with this second meaning is the address, the concrete content that a matter yields to a call. Thus, very often λόγος will be identical to εἶδος. Λόγος means address, that which the matter yields, and in the right addressing the matter yields that which it is, how it looks.
The wherefore is λόγος, and since it is this, and since λόγος is the ἀρχή, the wherefore is the first in-what-manner. If it is said that the wherefore is the λόγος of a matter, this is meant from a determinate type of encounter: the τέλος. Τέλος is the genuine λόγος. Τέλος is not “purpose,” but rather “beingcompleted,” “end.” The συνεστηκός, what is “standing there” as completed, is the genuine sense of the being-there of a being. When something is addressed in its being-completed, the address is proper. The τέλος, as being-completed, is that whereby production has its end. Being-completed as such is that with which production, making-complete, comes to its end. Τέλος, as the completed state of production, is that wherefore production is thus and so. Seen from the path of the coming-into-its-being of a being, the τέλος is the οὗ ἕνεκα.
Aristotle carries these connections through in an entirely concrete way. We want to follow him in this, and at the same time procure for ourselves the foundation by which this being-consideration is made intelligible, how τέλος is the λόγος of a being, how the sort of research pursued by the ancient physiologists went astray. The entire mode of treating φύσει ὄντα is directed from that standpoint. At the same time, we can see how the τέλος, as the genuine λόγος of the φύσει ὄντα, specifically of the ζῷα, is precisely nothing other than ψυχή, so that the physicist must treat the τέλος πρῶτον. Τέλος is not “aim-directedness,” τέλος is a φαινόμενον; not an instrument, but rather “being-there-completed,” in the way that the animal moves itself. With respect to τέλος, the primary thing to learn is that it comes to its being in being-there itself.
The consideration of Περὶ ζῴων μορίων, Book 1, Chapter 1, has several purposes: (1) discussion of φύσις, (2) in what manner does ψυχή fall within the field of investigation of the φυσικός? (3) an orientation toward the concrete fulfillment of the λόγος θεωρητικός—ἀλήθεια, (4) to obtain insight into that toward which the entire lecture is aiming: what do οὐσία and ὄν mean?
Οὐσία—previously, we proceeded from the customary meaning: οὐσία as the “present-being-that-is-there,” “what is at one’s disposal,” “possessions and