I return to the φαινόμενα, to being itself. The legitimacy of this respect is to be derived only from the matter itself. However, insofar as these beings are the φύσει ὄντα, beings characterized by coming-into-the-there, by γένεσις, the question is whether the οὗ ἕνεκα is the first or the ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, whether one is to consider the discussed subject area in its what—whether one is to be concerned with beings with respect to what they are, what they are as beings-that-are-there—or how they come to be with respect to γένεσις.

Since it is already decided that the question of the τί is the primary one, we will understand οὐσία on that basis, and we will understand γένεσις accordingly. Presumably, then, the οὗ ἕνεκα will give the answer to the τί question. The manner in which the οὗ ἕνεκα is primary is to be made intelligible. This is the basis for the way that beings are to be determined in their genuine being. The purpose is to then set down in writing the basic respect of that which is to be dealt with, to set forth the way of being of ζῷα. In other words, what must be set forth is the basic determination of beings that live, namely, ψυχή. What matters, in the context of this consideration, is seeing how Aristotle sets forth the character of the ἔμψυχον in a phenomenal manner, on the basis of how beings appear. At the same time, we will secure the ground for our main point, that ζωή as ψυχή means a being as being-in-the-world. It will be shown that the point is in the text itself and is not invented by me.

The answer to the question that the παιδεία of this discipline poses is given by Aristotle as follows: primarily, the respect that beings promote is the οὗ ἕνεκα. In the “wherefore” of what is questioned in this respect, beings must show, by way of this respect, how they themselves are. Here, it is a question of the φύσει ὄντα, specifically, a question of the γινόμενα, not of the ἀεὶ ὄντα, the οὐρανός, which likewise is φύσει ὄν. Instead, it is a question of the γινόμενα that are ἔμψυχα. The question, furthermore, is how this sense of being—in the sense given at the beginning—becomes decisive for the interpretation, insofar as it is a question of the being of human beings as πρᾶξις. The direction of being-interpretation runs through the categories of ἕξις, being as determinate “having,” “having something at one’s disposal.”

Initially, Aristotle grounds the claim that the οὗ ἕνεκα is the primary respect, by saying that the οὗ ἕνεκα is the λόγος. Why is it the primary respect for this reason? What, above all, does λόγος mean in this context? (1) Λόγος in the sense of access, ἀποφαίνεσθαι of beings as φαινόμενον. (2) Λόγος in the sense of answer, as address, how beings address themselves to a call; it restores beings to their look. In the first sense, beings are, through addressing, posited as something in a respect, this there as this or that, as a chair, for example. The λόγος fulfills this standing-out τὶ κατά τινος, something as something. In this aspect of λόγος, there arises the further possibility of λόγος as standing-out, articulating, λόγος as τὶ κατά τινος. Derived from this is the possibility of λόγος qua relation, for example, ἀνάλογον. Λόγος is the possibility of uncovering a relation; it is not itself a relation. Apart from this dual meaning of λόγος, there is yet a third. The genuinely average meaning, (3) where λόγος means both, exhibiting