as constitutive for the being itself that is there. Insofar as one sees the house in the way that it appears, one sees it not in an isolated way, one respect at a time, according to the time of day, in illumination, occupied by so and so; but instead one sees this being that is there in the way that one sees it, as house, in the average way, in the way one lives in it every day, and sees it as this what in the averageness of this being’s present in dealing. What is encountered in an average way in its look constitutes being-there. It is senseless to ask in what way the Greeks conceived of the “individual” way of being as a concrete determination of being-there. It did not occur at all to the Greek to see the genuine there in this hic et nunc.
β. The Being-Characters of the φύσει γινόμενα
How does Aristotle see and determine the φύσει ὄντα as living things following the guide of the ἔργα τέχνης?288 The first question concerns how the φύσει ὄν shows itself. What is the primary aspect in which these beings show themselves? πανταχοῦ δὲ λέγομεν τόδε τοῦδε ἕνεκα, ὅπου ἂν φαίνηται τέλος τι πρὸς ὃ ἡ κίνησις περαίνει μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος. ὥστε εἶναι φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστι τι τοιοῦτον, ὃ δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν φύσιν.289 “We always address something encountered as τόδε τοῦδε ἕνεκα, this there on account of this.” A fact is, as it is encountered, addressed looking thus and so with respect to the ἕνεκα τοῦδε. Where does this type of addressing fulfill itself, and how must something be encountered in order to be addressed in this way? What is the primary finding as to the phenomenal fact of the matter, as to the thing encountered itself, that we can address it in this way? It is always the case that “wherever something like a being-completed shows itself, something like a coming-to-the-end, to which as end the movement comes, such that nothing happens to trip it up, such that it is thus unhindered.” The primary experience is the seeing of a selfmoving being-completed. The constitutive aspect is that something is in movement in such a way that it comes to an end. “Accordingly, it is clear that this is the sort of thing that we address as φύσις.” It is always the case that where we see something like this, we need this type of addressing: τόδε τοῦδε ἕνεκα. Insofar as something is encountered by us in this way, being something of this sort, it is what we address manifestly as φύσις. The basic fact of the matter that characterizes the sense of φύσις as a mode of being-there is a being-that-iscomplete, whose being-completed or having-become is sublated in its havingcome-out-of . . . as self-producing. This is the fact of the matter that establishes this address of the ἕνεκα.
μᾶλλον δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις ἢ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τέχνης. τὸ δ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ὁμοίως, εἰς ὃ πειρῶνται πάντες σχεδὸν τοὺς λόγους ἀνάγειν οὐ διελόμενοι ποσαχῶς λέγεται
288. Cf. De part. an. Α 1, 641 b 23 sqq., 639 b 19 sqq., 641 b 12, 639 b 30 sqq.
289. De part. an. Α 1, 641 b 23 sqq.