is also discussed in a definite way. The ἄνευ ὕλης should not mislead us into thinking that εἶδος is seen as something non-sensible. The ὕλη is in the ἔργον, but not in the genuine relation. In the εἶδος, which is the anticipation of the ἔργον, that which, taken roughly, one designates as the purpose of a thing to be produced or a thing completed, is anticipated. The house as σκέπασμα is for occupying; the occupying of it is anticipated in the εἶδος of the house. The whither of the house is tied up in the house’s standing-out-in-such-and-such-away. For this reason, the εἶδος is that which constitutes the genuine being-there of a being in its being-completed, so that producedness, as a mode of beingthere established by εἶδος, belongs to the full determinateness of being-there as being-present-at-hand.
The determinate manner and mode in which ὕλη itself is determined is to be learned on the basis of this connection of ἔργον with ὕλη vis-à-vis λόγος and ποίησις. In no way is ὕλη mere not-being, μὴ ὄν, indefinite stuff or limit of form, in which case ὕλη would be the indeterminate. Ὕλη is, precisely, the determinate. This wood has, precisely, this or that suitability, on whose basis it comes into consideration as ὕλη, for application there. Ὕλη is δύναμις, the positive “possibility” of this or that, which only becomes visible from the εἶδος. On this, Aristotle says: λεκτέον γὰρ τὸ εἶδος καὶ ᾗ εἶδος ἔχει ἕκαστον, τὸ δ’ ὑλικὸν οὐδέποτε καθ’ αὑτὸ λεκτέον.295 “Therefore, that which is to be addressed is primarily the look of a being that is there at each moment, and that has its look, insofar as it has a look. The stuff-matter, that which the being that is there and that is in question consists of, is never to be addressed in itself.” Thus, with respect to λόγος, ὕλη is dependent; it must first be opened up by way of εἶδος. This λεκτέον is also authoritative for the present consideration. It depends on showing that, if nature is to be researched, it must be examined primarily according to its look. Only when the εἶδος is made visible is it possible to investigate the out-of-which of lasting in relation to the whence of coming to be, and therefore γένεσις. Thus the εἶδος, the οὐσία, is the establishment of γένεσις.
Following the guide of this fundamental consideration, that the εἶδος is the primary thing, Aristotle discusses the ancients more precisely, with respect to how widely they themselves had brought the φύσει ὄντα into view—the being of nature as living things, the beings that they have, and that we have, before our eyes—and specifically by posing the critical question: how are beings to be genuinely addressed? How do the tendencies with which the ancients were occupied earlier reach proper fulfillment? It is to be held concretely in view that the ancients too saw nature in movement. When Parmenides says that all being is ἕν, without movement, he must have been acquainted with movement.
Exposing nature in its being-there depends upon our way not being blocked by presupposed opinons and theories. The ancients also saw the nature that is
295. Met. Ζ 10, 1035 a 7 sqq.