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The Interpretation of the Being-There of Human Beings [228–230]

there in its alteration, in emerging and disappearing, and hence their question as to the whence. In Metaphysics, Book 1, Chapters 1–2, Aristotle discusses the riddle of the διότι.296 In everyday practical concern and living, human beings operate only inexplicitly within the why and wherefore. This is made explicit in λόγος, which is the basic mode of being-in-the-world. For the ancients, the being that is there was the leading respect, apprehended as consisting of . . . That is the immediate way of responding to the question concerning the what of the being-there of a chair or table, in that one says, this is wood. That is an answer, but not an answer to the genuine being-there of the being qua table. Insofar as appearing as table is not also taken as a basis for the discussion, the question as to the whence of beings must be forgone. Through researching this question, and considering nature in relation to it, one learns to answer the question concerning the being of beings that are there as tables.

Accordingly, the φύσει ὄντα are to be researched there in such a way that the εἶδος also comes into consideration, so it is not sufficient to question the φύσει ὄντα according to what they consist of, τὸ ἐκ τίνων,297 fire, water, earth, air. Taking hold of stuff is not adequate; rather, we must question the εἶδος too, just as in τέχνη. If we are producing something, it is not sufficient to simply take hold of materials; instead, it requires the advance indication of materials from the standpoint of the εἶδος. It looks thus and so, and consists of this or that material. κλίνη γὰρ τόδε ἐν τῷδε, ἢ τόδε τοιόνδε, ὥστε κἄν περὶ τοῦ σχήματος εἴη λεκτέον, καὶ ποῖον τὴν ἰδέαν.298 “For a matter like a bed-frame is a thing looking thus ἐν τῷδε, in such a thing.” Σχῆμα is the “outline,” “figure.” Specifically, it is to say, ποῖον τὴν ἰδέαν. “The σχῆμα is to determine what sort of thing it is in the look.” Ἰδέα: the single use of the word that appears in Aristotle is ἰδέα and εἶδος. Ἰδέα means nothing other than “look” (a front against Plato): “The outline of a being, in the way it is furnished with respect to its look”—outline of a being that is there, not merely a mass of wood and stone, not as though it exists somewhere in a supersensory way, but rather the outline as it shows itself. “For φύσις, the being-there of natural things, taken with respect to μορφή [the same as σχῆμα], is superior to the beings of natural things, taken with respect to the out-of-which of their lasting, τῆς ὑλικῆς φύσεως.”299 In μορφή, in σχῆμα, I obtain the being of natural things genuinely.

On this issue, Aristotle points out that in fact, among the ancients, Democritus posed this question, that he was the first to arrive at the σχῆμα, the “figure” of things. Democritus emphasizes that σχῆμα and χρῶμα (optical determination of being) are what determine a being as φύσει ὄν in its being. “It should be, then, that Democritus speaks correctly, when he exhibits the figure and color of living being. In particular, he says that it is manifest to everyone that the human being is what he is with respect to his look, since the human being is known


296. Cf. Met. Α 1, 981 a 28 sqq.

297. De part. an. Α 1, 640 b 22.

298. De part. an. Α 1, 640 b 26 sqq.

299. De part. an. Α 1, 640 b 28: ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν μορφὴν φύσις κυριωτέρα τῆς ὑλικῆς φύσεως.


Martin Heidegger (GA 18) Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy page 3

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