and familiar to us according to his color and figure.”300 Yet Aristotle says “that the deceased also has the same look and figure but is not the human being.”301 Thus it appears that this determination of the look is not quite sufficient in the end, that the look is not yet fully grasped as σχῆμα and χρῶμα. “Furthermore, a hand cannot possibly be what it is if it comes to be out of just anything, for example, out of metal or wood.”302 A hand made out of wood is no hand. To be sure, it looks just like one, and would have to be one according to Democritus’s determination of the being of the hand. However, it cannot fulfill its specific function, just as a flute made out of stone is no flute, since one cannot play it.303 A hand made out of wood is not alive; it is not there as hand. Thus the ἔργον and the δύναμις belong to the εἶδος. A being that looks thusly, that shows itself as such and such—the constitutivum for the there-character of the living thing, is function, the ἔργον, by which function the out-of-which of lasting is determined. A hand cannot consist of wood; it requires a σῶμα τοιοῦτον. The ὕλη has to satisfy the characteristic function of the hand as μόριον of the ζῷον.
Thus Aristotle says: λίαν οὖν ἁπλῶς εἴρηται.304 “It is said too simply,” as Democritus and the ancients said it. In this way, the ancients who spoke about nature oriented being merely toward the σχῆμα alone (Democritus), and Democritus believed himself to have given, thereby, the correct determination of being. In fact, however, he did not get any grasp on the being-there of living things. It is precisely “as if a τέκτων, a carpenter, were to speak about a wooden hand,” to deal with something that looks like a hand but is not. λίαν οὖν ἁπλῶς εἴρηται, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τέκτων λέγοι περὶ χειρὸς ξυλίνης. οὕτως γὰρ καὶ οἱ φυσιολόγοι τὰς γενέσεις καὶ τὰς αἰτίας τοῦ σχήματος λέγουσιν· ὑπὸ τίνων γὰρ ἐδημιουργήθησαν δυνάμεων. ἀλλ’ ἴσως ὁ μὲν τέκτων ἐρεῖ πέλεκυν ἢ τρύπανον, ὁ δ’ ἀέρα καὶ γῆν, πλὴν βέλτιον ὁ τέκτων. οὐ γὰρ ἱκανὸν ἔσται αὐτῷ τὸ τοσοῦτον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἐμπεσόντος τοῦ ὀργάνου τὸ μὲν κοῖλον ἐγένετο τὸ δὲ ἐπίπεδον, ἀλλὰ διότι τὴν πληγὴν ἐποιήσατο τοιαύτην, καὶ τίνος ἕνεκα, ἐρεῖ τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅπως τοιόνδε ἢ τοιόνδε ποτὲ τὴν μορφὴν γένηται.305 If a carpenter is asked about the γένεσις of what he produced, “from what possibilities,” and with what means the being was produced in such and such a way, “it is not sufficient to answer thus: since the work implement [a hammer] fell on it,” it looked thus and so. Hence, the ancients speak about nature as follows: since things looking thus are thrown together, they came to be thus. The τέκτων understands his being much better; he is much more likely
300. De part. an. Α 1, 640 b 29 sqq.: εἰ μὲν οὖν τῷ σχήματι καὶ τῷ χρώματι ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν τε ζῷων καὶ τῶν μορίων, ὀρθῶς ἂν δημόκριτος λέγοι [ . . . ]. φησὶ γοῦν παντὶ δῆλον εἶναι οἷόν τι τὴν μορφήν ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς ὄντος αὐτοῦ τῷ τε σχήματι καὶ τῷ χρώματι γνωρίμου.
301. De part. an. Α 1, 640 b 34 sq.: καὶ ὁ τεθνεὼς ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ σχήματι μορφήν ἀλλ’ ὅμως οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος.
302. De part. an. Α 1, 640 b 35 sq.: ἔτι δ’ ἀδύνατον εἶναι χεῖρα ὁπωσοῦν διακειμένην, οἷον χαλκῆν ἢ ξυλίνην.
303. Cf. De part. an. Α 1, 641 a 2 sq.
304. De part. an. Α 1, 641 a 5.
305. De part. an. Α 1, 641 a 5 sqq.