to say, “why he hammers in such a way and for what reason [the purpose for which he wields the hammer thus], he will speak of the causes, wherein the μορφή was determined thus and so.” The τέχνη will determine its ποίησις, and the τέχνη has its ground in the anticipation of the εἶδος.
Even in the case of living things, questioning must be carried out in the right manner as to the τέλος. For this, questioning must be carried out with regard to the δύναμις and the ἔργον. Thus it is true that the ancients did not address what is living in the right manner. “If that [which genuinely determines the look of a living thing, which determines the look in such a way that a hand is as hand], if that is, in the end, what we designate as soul, then the φυσικός [if he wants to treat living things as beings that are there] must necessarily deal with the soul.”306 The question is simply whether it is the entire soul, or only a definite part of the soul that must be dealt with.
We will finish and then return to the πάθη. If the πάθη are to be the object of investigation, then it appears that with the πάθη, as disposition of living things, in which corporeality is at the same time a concern, the εἶδος must first be kept in view. Genuine being-there must be set forth, in order, if possible, to study even what is “physiological,” the “bodily conditions.” Thus in the consideration of the somatic, orientation is given by the εἶδος of human living, characterized as ζωὴ πρακτικὴ μετὰ λόγου.
d) The Dual Proof of the Restricted Scope of the φυσικός
We have seen how Aristotle worked out basic determinations in the criticism of the natural philosophy of his predecessors—those basic determinations that are decisive for natural beings with the character of living. Specifically, he says that it is not sufficient to advance from ὕλη to a grasp of the σχῆμα, which in a certain sense is already the ἰδέα, but insofar as one remains there, one genuinely fails. In ἰδέα, living is characterized as δύναμις, that which is able, and on account of this fact, ὕλη, as co-determining being, contains the corresponding characterization and determination. The hand is only hand as living, insofar as it can grasp and feel, and a hand being thus requires that its ὕλη be something determinate, that it be organized, characterized by the determinate being of being-able. The ὕλη is the “flesh,” σάρξ. Thus, what hitherto had been not observed by the ancients appears as a being-able, which determines the being of ὕλη, what we designate as soul.
The question now is: does the φυσικός have to research the being of life in all its possibilities and its entire extent, or is the topic of the physicist only a determinate extract of life with respect to its being?307 Aristotle answers this question in two ways: (1) indirectly and (2) on the basis of the finding of how natural beings show themselves as living. In both cases, he has recourse to the same finding of the self-showing of the beings in question.
306. De part. an. Α 1, 641 a 17 sqq.: εἰ δὴ τοῦτό ἐστι ψυχὴ [ . . . ], τοῦ φυσικοῦ περὶ ψυχῆς ἂν εἴη λέγειν.
307. Cf. De part. an. Α 1, 641 a 32 sqq.