α. Indirect Proof
He leads up to the indirect proof of the restricted scope in the following way: if the φυσικός were to research all living things that he encounters, in general, with regard to their being-living, “then there would be no philosophy beside this science, the φυσική.”308 That is unintelligible at first. This train of thought is grounded in a definite presupposition. “For supposing and understanding [roughly, thinking] are directed at the thinkable,”309 at that which is the possible object of thinking and supposing. The thinkable, the entire field of possible perceiving, is πάντα. Everything that in any sense is is νοητόν. “Accordingly, the object of φυσική ἐπιστήμη would be all beings in general.”310 We are asking: under what assumption does this train of thought follow? Only if, for Aristotle, the consideration of beings in their being also necessarily belongs to the consideration of beings with the character of living, in which case the living thing in question is grounded in its being-possibility, to which it is related as the with-which of dealings. Only if living originarily means beingin-a-world, being-in the mode of being-by-something, of being-by, and the there-by is the world, in which a being that is there-by is as living; only then does this consideration follow. If νοῦς were to fall within the scope of the consideration, if νοῦς were an object, then all νοητά would also have to be objects of φυσική ἐπιστήμη. “It is the interest of the same science to deal with being in the sense of perceiving, thinking, deliberating, and so on, and to deal with being in the sense of the thinkable, provided that thinking and the thinkable are toward each other, πρὸς ἄλληλα.”311 (Πρὸς with the accusative: “toward” something, “in relation to” it.) Thinking is nothing other than this πρὸς. Thinking demands, in accordance with its being, to be open to the other; its being cannot be understood, seen primarily, if the toward-which is not there, which it in itself is after, as perceiving, fearing. The basic determination of beings as living things is visible here as πρὸς ἄλληλα, to be “before another,” to be open “for another.” “It is always one and the same research (in all cases) where it deals with determining the character of the πρὸς ἄλληλα.”312 The living thing can only be determined in its being if the being that it is with is understood in its being. Living is being-by. Only under this assumption does the train of thought follow.
Aristotle himself does not further pursue the result of the indirect proof. He would have to continue thus: the φυσικός only deals with beings, φύσει ὄν, that are κινούμενον. But there are also beings-in-movement that are not in the mode of living, insofar as νοῦς is the decisive possibility. To the extent
308. De part. an. Α 1, 641 a 34 sqq.: εἰ γὰρ περὶ πάσης, οὐδεμία λείπεται παρὰ τὴν φυσικὴν ἐπιστήμην φιλοσοφία.
309. De part. an. Α 1, 641 a 36: ὁ γὰρ νοῦς τῶν νοητῶν.
310. De part. an. Α 1, 641 a 36 sq.: ὥστε περὶ πάντων ἡ φυσικὴ γνῶσις ἂν εἴη.
311. De part. an. Α 1, 641 b 1 sq.: τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς περὶ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ θεωρῆσαι, εἴπερ πρὸς ἄλληλα.
312. De part. an. Α 1, 641 b 2 sq.: ἡ αὐτὴ θεωρία τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντων.