The Interpretation of the Being-There of Human Beings [235–236]

that νοῦς, the νοητά, are excluded by the indirect proof, these φύσει ὄντα that are in the mode of living can only be treated as living things, things that are ἀνόητον, that are not in such a way that they think about their being, so that their being is guided by thinking and considering. It follows that only living things that possess the character of the ἀνόητον come under consideration. Aristotle contrasts the ἀνόητα with those beings that possess φρόνησις, φρόνησις as διανοεῖσθαι: ἀνόητα—φρόνιμα, ἄλογα—ἔλλογα.313 Ἔλλογα: that in which λόγος is in the mode of λόγον ἔχον in the primary sense. Aristotle uses these expressions interchangeably. He says about the occasion of the development of science that animals too possess a φρόνησις in a certain way: φρόνησις, here, as orienting-oneself, αἴσθησις; here, φρόνησις is not determined by νοῦς, not in the genuine sense.

The living thing is distinguished, with regard to its being, by being-by. Aristotle has this basic determination so keenly in view that he can indicate in advance, on the basis of this meaning of being, the mode of access, and the construction of the individual steps of all research concerning living, of this fundamental determination.314 This methodological meaning is important for seeing how research into the so-called psychic has to be instituted. The question is whether a living thing, insofar as it lives, possesses various being-possibilities,315 that it can perceive something (αἴσθησις), that it is after something (ὄρεξις), that it can move toward it, and so on, or that it possesses the world in such a way that it thinks about it. “The difficulty is how one brings these separate being-possibilities of a living thing to the fore, how they are in their with-one-another, which among the being-possibilites is to be researched first. The question is whether the being-possibilities of living are to be researched in themselves or by their fulfillment, whether I can study, primarily, the abilityto-perceive in this way. And if it happens that one must, in fact, study the ἔργα first, whether the ἀντικείμενα are, then, to be studied first; that which at any time is over against a definite being-possibility of living, over against, say, αἴσθησις, perceiving as such [in the case of the ὄψις, the world in the character of being-colored.]”316 In fact, we must proceed with the ἀντικείμενα; the ἔργον can only be grasped along with it. “It must first be said what thinking itself is in its fulfillment.”317 πρότεραι γάρ εἰσι τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ ἐνέργειαι καὶ τὸν λόγον.318 “For actual beings that are there, that are present prior to possibilities, are earlier with regard to addressing.” I only acquire a possibility to apprehend, I only catch sight of something, by catching sight of it, so to speak, in

313. Eth. Nic. Κ 2, 1172 b 10, 1173 a 2 sq.

314. De an. Α 1, 402 b 9 sqq. and correspondingly Β 4, 415 a 16 sqq.

315. De an. Α 1, 402 b 9: εἰ [ . . . ] μόρια.

316. De an. Α 1, 402 b 10 sqq.: χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ τούτων διορίσαι ποῖα πέφυκεν ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, καὶ πότερον τὰ μόρια χρὴ ζητεῖν πρότερον ἢ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν, οἷον [ . . . ] τὸ αἰσθητικόν· [ . . . ] εἰ δὲ τὰ ἔργα πρότερον, πάλιν ἄν τις ἀπορήσειεν εἰ τὰ ἀντικείμενα πρότερα τούτων ζητητέον, οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν [ . . . ] καὶ τὸ νοητόν.

317. De an. Β 4, 415 a 18: πρότερον ἔτι λεκτέον τί τὸ νοεῖν.

318. De an. Β 4, 415 a 19 sqq.

Page generated by BasConAriPhiSteller.EXE