e) The Definiteness of the History of the Study of Nature by Way of Truth Itself
The critical consideration of previous studies of nature yields a peculiar insight into the historical course that such research can take. It turns out that a science can already be operating for a long time, that material is collected and certain properties and theories are unearthed; and yet this science does not at all need to be by its object, and the advancement of a science is not at all dependent upon the degree of acuity or argumentative skill that instead depend upon it. Science is a matter of the correct relationship to the matters. That cannot be forced, but is something that depends on ourselves, above all with regard to preparations. However, it is, in its ground, a matter of fate to what extent those that make this basic relationship vital come along and are there. Despite these theories, the researcher gradually became compelled by truth itself to see beings.
In the same context, Aristotle uses two characteristic expressions that are important for what he understands by truth. Of Empedocles, he says: ἐνιαχοῦ δέ που αὐτῇ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς περιπίπτει, ἀγόμενος ὑπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας.326 He was “led by truth itself,” which in a certain sense allowed his theory to collapse. And of Democritus: ἀλλ’ ἥψατο μὲν Δημόκριτος πρῶτος, ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαίου δὲ τῇ φυσικῇ θεωρίᾳ, ἀλλ’ ἐκφερόμενος ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος.327 He was “borne by the matter itself,” and led to the discovery that beings must be apprehended not merely with regard to ὕλη, but also with regard to their σχῆμα. Here, ἀλήθεια and πρᾶγμα are employed in the same sense, that is, ἀλήθεια is not “validity,” which adheres to the proposition, or something like that (as is meant by an erroneous logic). Instead, πρᾶγμα is nothing other than the being in its being-uncovered, insofar as the being with which I have to do is there in a certain discoveredness. Access to the matter was hindered because the question concerning the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι was denied, insofar as all research in the narrow sense, regarding the what and the how, was to ask: ἐπὶ Σωκράτους δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ηὐξήθη, τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν τὰ περὶ φύσεως ἔληξε, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρήσιμον ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀπέκλιναν οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες.328 Socrates promoted the task of being occupied with the matter itself. However, at that time, the ζητεῖν περὶ φύσεως was left behind. One turned toward πολιτική, and the φύσει ὄντα receded into the background. That is not an incidental omission, perhaps due to their having pursued the human sciences more than the natural sciences. Instead, it is a fundamental oversight. Even the concepts of being-in-the-πόλις have their foundation in concepts of nature. Aristotle saw that and shifted the weight of his work primarily onto the examination of φύσις as being. From there, he attained the ground for the study of being as such.
326. De part. an. Α 1, 642 a 18 sq.
327. De part. an. Α 1, 642 a 26 sqq.
328. De part. an. Α 1, 642 a 28 sqq.