enhancement of the possibility that lies in the frightening, is taken over by the σημεῖα: (1) ἔχθρα, ὀργή; (2) ἀδικία, “unjust character,” specifically of a δύναμιν ἔχοντος,363 “of one that has power,” namely, to that which he is possibly resolved; (3) ἀρετὴ ὑβριζομένη.
Ad 1. The question is, to what extent is the threatening brought into proximity, specifically, to what extent is danger constituted, by ἔχθρα, ὀργή, “hostile attitude,” and “rage.” Hostile attitude and rage are characterized by προαίρεσις. Rage and malevolent character are encountered as modes of being-there that can explode at any moment. Whether it does so is uncertain, but it can. Rage brings precisely this “can” to a head.
Ad 2. Ἀδικία: one who has the proclivity for injuring others, and the power to do it. Here, again, is the determination of προαίρεσις that brings the can into dangerousness. It has to do with ‘can’ in a double sense: (a) insofar as he has the power to carry out what he is up to—he can; (b) insofar as this havingpower is in προαίρεσις, it is shifted into a second ‘can’ such that behind this ‘can’ (in the first sense) stands the second ‘can’ of προαίρεσις, of “being-ableto- resolve-onself.” δύναμις is set into the proper possibility through the sense of ἀδικία. The threatening becomes the dangerous. With the shifting-into-oneanother of the senses of ‘can,’ the uncertainty of that which is impending for me is enhanced.
Ad 3. Ἀρετὴ ὑβριζομένη, “provoked seriousness.” The provoked is constantly at the ready. Without my knowing, he can become danger, he can harm me. Insofar as he can injure me by surprise, he is dangerous.
All of these aspects, as σημεῖα, themselves take over the character of that which they indicate. They are the announcing of these threatening things, and while they announce, they themselves become frightening. The toward-which of reference conveys its being-character, as threatening, to the referring itself. That which is announced by the σημεῖα shifts, for its part, the characters into the character of the threatening. Through the announcement, the threatening becomes the dangerous. The σημεῖα cultivate the dangerousness of the threatening, and so themselves become dangerous.
d) Human Beings Themselves insofar as They Are Frightening (φοβεροί)
In accordance with this consideration of φοβερά and their peculiar character of announcing, through which they come into my proximity, Aristotle discusses φοβεροί, i.e, human beings themselves insofar as they are frightening. He begins this consideration by making a general claim. The possibility that human beings be frightening to one another lies (1) in the fact that human beings are “of bad character,” that they are after bad things; (2) that they are “after their own advantage, after profit”; (3) that they are mostly “cowardly,” they do not stand up for anything, you cannot count on them.364
363. Rhet. Β 5, 1382 a 34 sq.: ἀδικία δύναμιν ἔχουσα.
364. Rhet. Β 5, 1382 b 4 sq.: ἐπεὶ δ’ οἱ πολλοὶ χείρους καὶ ἥττους τοῦ κερδαίνειν καὶ δειλοὶ ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις.