9. “Among enemies and opponents, those that plainly attack, that wear their heart on their sleeve and speak out plainly about everything that they are thinking, are not very frightening. Much more frightening are the πρᾶοι, the reserved, the εἴρωνες, the ironic [those who act as though the things they deal with are not as important as they are considered to be], the πανοῦργοι, the slick ones. [One does not know where one stands with them—distinctive uncertainty. One does not know whether everything is all right with them, or whether they only act as though it is.] With them, it is not manifest whether a threat is near [whether they are planning something], so it is never clear that, in fact, no danger is present”373—enhancement of the uncertainty through the indeterminacy of proximity.
You have seen, through the examples by which Aristotle characterizes the φοβεροί, that what is at issue here, according to the entire context, are the relations between one πόλις and others, and the relations among individuals within the πόλις—the φοβεροί seen according to this orientation of being-with-one-another.
e) The Genuineness of the Frightening (φοβερόν)
Here, Aristotle gives a genuine characterization of the φοβερόν. The sort of thing that one has missed and can no longer put right, what one has been able to evade but is now unavoidable—that is frightening to the highest degree. It is unavoidable, not in an absolute sense, but for me; the unavoidability is there with the opponent.374 Such a situation presents what is frightening in the highest sense. The unavoidable, not in an absolute sense, but only for me. The possibility of unavoidability is there with another who is hostile to me. Insofar as unavoidability is not absolute, but is there with another, and the other possesses προαίρεσις, it is characterized as threat. This being-threatened is determined through the ἐλπίς of the one threatened. Even what is threatening to the highest degree must, in a certain sense, hold out the prospect of remaining absent. The frightening becomes more genuine, the more the prospect of help disappears. Where there is no help, and yet it is still expected by the one threatened, the prospect of it remaining absent must still persist.
f) Disposition in Being Afraid
Being afraid must be characterized as an οἴεσθαι. The one who is brought into fear must once “believe” that the definite thing that threatens, threatens him, and further, that what is threatening proceeds from this definite human being,
373. Rhet. Β 5, 1382 b 19 sqq.: τῶν [ . . . ] ἐχθρῶν ἢ ἀντιπάλων οὐχ οἱ ὀξύθυμοι καὶ παρρησιαστικοί, ἀλλὰ οἱ πρᾶοι καὶ εἴρωνες καὶ πανοῦργοι· ἄδηλοι γὰρ εἰ ἐγγύς, ὥστε οὐδέποτε φανεροὶ ὅτι πόρρω.
374. Rhet. Β 5, 1382 b 22 sqq.: πάντα δὲ τὰ φοβερὰ φοβερώτατα ὅσα ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἐπανορθώσασθαι μὴ ἐνδέχεται, ἀλλ’ ἢ ὅλως ἀδύνατα, ἢ μὴ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις.