a having-with-one-another of definite δόξαι, which is oriented by how being-there itself speaks about itself at the moment.
This κοινωνία still has the special possibility of humans being-with-one-another reciprocally: of ὁμιλία or of συζῆν.383 This “living-with-one-another” is, however, characterized in an average and everyday way by δόξα. Being-there in everydayness maintains itself in the “more or less”; it operates in degrees. With regard to itself, it is not so exacting; it is non-concrete to a certain extent. A human being is non-concrete in relation to himself. Insofar as he is this, and at the same time has the possibility of deciding something genuine for himself, that is, is in the possibility of προαίρεσις, he also has a ἕξις with respect to the uncoveredness of his being. There is also a ἕξις in relation to ὁμιλία, συζῆν. It is having the legitimacy of comportment toward others and toward oneself at one’s disposal. Whoever is defined by this ἕξις is designated by Aristotle as the ἀληθευτικός,384 which means having being-there with respect to discoveredness at one’s disposal, presenting oneself so that one’s self-presentation and being with others is not a self-concealing, feigning, presenting oneself as one is and as one thinks.
The συζῆν is characterized by ζωὴ πρακτικὴ μετὰ λόγου. This ἕξις occurs ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσιν καὶ τῷ προσποιήματι.385 Προσποίημα: asserting about oneself in the sense of talking oneself into that which one asserts of oneself, that which one claims about oneself in the sense that one talks oneself into it, what is asserted about oneself. This προσποίημα, προσποίησις is for the most part in degrees. Customarily and for the most part human beings are, hiddenly or evidently, in ὁμιλία (1) in the character of the ἀλαζών, or (2) in that of the εἴρων. Ἀλαζών is he who makes something up about himself, who discourses grandly about himself: δοκεῖ δὴ ὁ μὲν ἀλαζὼν προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει,386 “he who says about himself what universally enjoys reputation.” That is a ἕξις: initially and for the most part, the human being maintains himself as ἀλαζών; he sticks to speaking the sort of thing that universally enjoys reputation, vis-à-vis asserting about oneself the sort of thing “that is not at all at one’s disposal,” or that is “greater or more significant than what one is oneself”—making something up about oneself, so that one conceals one’s genuine being, not the sort who presents his being undisguisedly. The other possibility is characterized by the εἴρων: ἀρνεῖσθαι [δοκεῖ] τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν,387 “who denies what he is, who does not present his being in the way it shows itself immediately, who makes his being less important”—Socrates, who passes himself off as one who
383. Eth. Nic. Δ 12, 1126 b 11: ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ τῷ συζῆν. Δ 13, 1127 a 18 sq.: ἐν δὴ τῷ συζῆν οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμιλοῦντες εἴρηνται.
384. Eth. Nic. Δ 13, 1127 a 24.
385. Eth. Nic. Δ 13, 1127 a 20.
386. Eth. Nic. Δ 13, 1127 a 21 sq.
387. Eth. Nic. Δ 13, 1127 a 23.