are three aspects: concretely giving basic experience, guiding claim, prevailing intelligibility.
1. Concretely giving basic experience: we must understand that this being, which is called human being-there, has the possibility of carrying in itself the conceptual. How is conceptuality itself possible in being-there? Being-there is being-in-the-world. Insofar as it is, it stands in experience. Being-there has itself, finds itself in relation to itself, even if it often does so in such a way that being-there has itself in the world, and on the path beyond the world, in which it lives. I am in certain possibilities: my job, my occupation.
2. The guiding claim: this being-there has, in itself, a definite sense of being and, corresponding to that, what it is not.
3. Being-there has a definite standard of intelligibility, as in the way it speaks of and about itself, and about the manner and mode in which it deals.
How is conceptuality itself possible in a being-there thus characterized? We must distinguish two possibilities. If science is something to which being-there can resolve itself, ἕξις, then this ἕξις is characterized by its being: πῶς ἔχομεν πρὸς ἄλλων—πῶς, that which it is πρός, “against,” “in relation to” something, from which it extricates itself. Therefore, the first possibility in the sense of the arrangement against which ἕξις is cultivated; the second possibility, then, in the positive sense.
a) The Possibility of Conceptuality in the Negative Sense of That in Relation to Which Conceptuality Is Cultivated
α. The Interpretedness of Being-There in Fore-Having, Fore-Sight, and Fore-Grasp
Initially this conceptuality is not there in an original way; the possibilities of the conceptual are initially cut off by being-there. Being-there as being-inthe-world is primarily governed by λόγος, operates in word-thinking, hearing-saying, reading-learning; and that with respect to three aspects. Being-there as being-in-the-world is always a being in what is already familiar, what is already interpreted thus and so; being-there is already apprehended as thus and so. Coming into the world, one grows into a determinate tradition of speaking, seeing, interpreting. Being-in-the-world is an already-having-the-world-thus-and-so. This peculiar fact, that the world into which I enter, in which I awaken, is there for me in a determinate interpretedness, I designate terminologically as the fore-having.
The world is there as already thus and so, and with it my being-there in the world too; and in dealing with it, a definite way of addressing, in which the world is cared for, is discussed. This circumscribes a definite possibility of conceiving, of posing questions, that is, the respects are already there in relation to which the world is cared for. The fore-having is already posited, at the outset, in a definite fore-sight. The being that is already there stands in a definite respect; all seeing, all taking-in-some-respect, is determined in the