concrete sense. Beings, namely, the world and living, are cared for under the guidance of a definite sense of being: being-produced, being-present, in which, precisely, this sense of being does not need to be explicit. Precisely by its being inexplicit, it possesses a peculiar stubbornness in the guidance and leading of the taking-in-some-respect.
That which is thus already possessed at the outset—the world and living, and together with them, that which is already set in this definite fore-sight and is explicated under its guidance—is at the same time expressed for the most part and in an average way: ἀποφαίνεσθαι—“exhibited,” articulated. Under the guidance of the respect, the look is now explicated more precisely, that is, to the extent that the claim to intelligibility governs, a definite idea of a proof and of conduciveness is guiding. If we recall the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, we know that the mathematical disciplines guided the manner and mode of the conceptual, the claim to scientific rigor. Definite possibilities of conceiving can gain dominance; all others must be assimilated to the dominant one. This was the tendency, as it was in the nineteenth century: since the mathematical sciences are the rigorous sciences, the historical sciences must proceed in precisely the same way. That was a misunderstanding, as in all such cases. The governing intelligibility, which includes expressing as articulation, I designate as fore-grasp.
These three aspects are connected in themselves as having, sight, and grasp. Every having stands in a definite regard, and is articulated by the expressed—grasp—and this whole is characterized as fore: at the outset, already prevailing in the being-there into which I grow. These three aspects characterize in their unity that which I designate as interpretation of being-there, being-transparent.
β. Λόγος as the Possibility of Error and Dissimulation
Λόγος possesses the mastery of interpretedness. Λόγος is the genuine bearer of interpretedness, λόγος as the mastery of interpretedness. Insofar as this λόγος is that in which all that is conceptual occurs, it is also that which constitutes the possibility of error in being-there as thus characterized. The experienced and the seen is, for the most part, what is expressed. In expression, it is communicated to others, and through this communication comes into circulation: what is repeated. In this speaking-around-us, idle chatter, what is expressed increasingly loses its ground. Through this idle chatter, this being-further-spoken without recourse to the expressed matter, idle chatter comes to cover up and dissimulate that which is genuinely meant. What is expressed carries in itself the possibility of dissimulation in the literal sense. Communicating already is, in a certain sense, a leading astray, even if it does so implicitly and not deliberately. Insofar as this leading astray is grasped as purposeful, it yields the possibility of deception and of being-deceived—dominance of the false, of the ψεῦδος. From there, we also see the connection between λόγος and εἶδος. Εἶδος: look, in the way that it is. Λόγος: what is expressed, the address. Insofar