as λόγος is what governs, I draw my knowledge from hearing-saying. It is also through this λόγος that εἶδος becomes a look, but in the as; it looks as though it is such and such . . . , but is not so. Something looks like gold, but is not; something that is taken to be the case—seeming, εἶδος, as look in the sense of only-looking-thus.
That refers not only to the everyday, that being-there with which one has to do, but in a much more precise measure pertains to that interpreting of beingthere that is made into the explicit task of being there: research and philosophy. Definite λόγοι that, once expressed, precisely at times when research activities are young and vital, can assume such a dominance, that for a long time they render the beings that they refer to inaccessible. The λόγος of Parmenides, that “beings are one,” ἓν τὸ ὄν,2 possesses such a dominance within the interpretation of being-there. This λόγος was also a positive motive for posing the being-question in the genuine sense, and to solve it in terms of the standards of Greek possibilities. One can see in the Nicomachean Ethics, Η 14, that Aristotle had a keen understanding of the dominance of λόγος: κληρονομία ὀνόματος, the “heritage of the word,” word-meaning—that these κληρονομία ὀνόματος, specifically of ἡδονή, were taken over early on from a definite interpretation of being-there—ἀλλ’ εἰλήφασι τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος κληρονομίαν αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ διὰ τὸ πλειστάκις τε παραβάλλειν εἰς αὐτὰς καὶ πάντας μετέχειν αὐτῶν.3 The feeling that lies closest is sensory pleasure, enjoyment; this feeling-oneself, interpreted in the horizon of the average feeling of the crowd, took over the heritage of the word ἡδονή. Ἡδονή need not originally mean what it means in the interpretation of the being-there of the many. This everyday meaning seizes hold of the interpretation.
Since the everyday can seize hold of heritage, it follows that being-there has the possibility of tearing heritage away from the everyday, and bringing it to an original interpretedness, that is, out of everydayness, and in opposition to it in the ἕξις to appropriate the conceptual in the genuine sense. Fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-grasp are, at the same time, possibilities of something genuine: to explicitly appropriate the fore-having, to cultivate the fore-sight, and to carry through the fore-grasp, following this that is secured. The conceptual is not something that comes forth from out of being-there and is somehow discovered in addition to it, but rather the proper possibility of the conceptual is just the conceptual as apprehended interpretation of being-there itself.
b) The Possibility of Conceptuality in the Positive Sense of the Possibility of That for Which Conceptuality Is Cultivated: Νοῦς as διανοεῖσθαι
We must still, at least briefly, come to an understanding of possibility in the
2. Parmenides, fr. 8, 3 sqq, in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker: Griechisch und Deutsch, edited by H. Diels, fourth edition, Volume I, Berlin 1922, 18 Β: ἐὸν [. . .] ἕν. Aristoteles, Met. Α 5, 986 b 29: ἓν οἴεται εἶναι τὸ ὄν.
3. Eth. Nic. Η 14, 1153 b 33 sqq.