positive sense. Being-there operates in a prevailing interpretedness, which Aristotle designates as ὑπολήψεις: living, being-with-one-another, holds opinion, namely with regard to definite basic facts of the matter; it has definite “holding-of-opinions.” Ὑπολήψεις are the primary contents of the interpretation of being-there; we must inquire into what they mean. They must be liberated from that which has been accumulated through idle chatter and pointless discussion of it. Insofar as such a task is grasped, being-there no longer operates in specifically practical activity—λόγος is its independent accomplishment as ἀποφαίνεσθαι: to clarify dealing with the world, with living no longer as an acting, a managing in the sense of practical concern, but rather debating, that which itself becomes visible in the expressed, and to clarify this apart from any application. Insofar as λόγος is independent, it depends solely upon speaking in the sense of exhibiting. The question is: wherein does independent speaking operate? If λόγος is no longer μετά for πρᾶξις, then for what is it μετά? Insofar as πρᾶξις is now given up, λόγος becomes independent, and the question is: to what is the μετά related? Accordingly, λόγος is not simply no longer μετά; the accomplishment of λόγος is ἀποφαίνεσθαι. Even here, in its pure function, it is related to bringing-to-seeing as mode of fulfillment of looking-out as such. We now possess διανοεῖσθαι, ἐπιστήμη μετὰ λόγου. Independence of λόγος means that it is μετά for νοεῖν and διανοεῖσθαι. “Supposing,” “perceiving,” are characteristics that determine being-in-the-world more precisely with regard to being-oriented.
Aristotle, De Anima, Γ 4: νοῦς is that ᾧ γινώσκει τε ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ φρονεῖ.4 “Supposing” is the genuine being-possibility of being-in-the-world, of “being-familiar-with . . .” as well as of φρονεῖν, “looking-around-oneself.” The two possibilities of being-oriented are (1) mere taking-into-acquaintance without any practical aim and (2) looking-around-oneself. Therefore (1) being-oriented toward something, (2) being-oriented for something.
Insofar as νοῦς is a basic determination of being-in-the-world, it characterizes the being of being-there as being-oriented. Νοῦς, orientation, has a genuine character in human being-there: ὁ καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς.5 Aristotle speaks of “so-called” νοῦς, never simply of νοῦς, but of νοῦς in the way that it is familiar in everydayness, in the way that one speaks of it and the only way that one can speak of it initially. This καλούμενος νοῦς, not genuine νοῦς, is characterized as διανοεῖσθαι.6 We must ask: how does this happen? Why is supposing, insofar as it is fulfilled in human being-there, a διανοεῖσθαι?
The context of Book 3 of De Anima is: origin of διά, of the fact that the νοῦς of human beings is a δια-νοεῖσθαι. “Perceiving and supposing are equally the simple calling of something.”7 To perceive something: to see, in one
4. De an. Γ 4, 429 a 10 sq.
5. De an. Γ 4, 429 a 22.
6. De an. Γ 4, 429 a 23: λέγω δὲ νοῦν ᾧ διανοεῖται [. . .]ἡ ψυχή.
7. De an. Γ 7, 431 a 8: τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅμοιον τῷ φάναι μόνον καὶ νοεῖν.