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stroke, as there. To suppose something: a naming or calling, to call something by a name, to name or call in simply having-there. Closer connection between speaking and seeing, αἴσθησις and φάσις apart from any broader structure—νοεῖν, which has the structure of simply having-there. How does it come about that this supposing is a δια-νοεῖσθαι? Insofar as νοῦς is νοῦς τῆς ψυχῆς—ψυχή which constitutes genuine being-in-the-world. For Aristotle, ζῆν, ζωή is plainly identified with ἡδονή, disposition. All finding is a finding-oneself with and toward a ἡδύ and a λυπηρόν, in short, a συμφέρον. Disposition, ἡδονή, has the two possibilities of δίωξις and φυγή, “going-toward” the συμφέρον and “shrinking-back before it.” Δίωξις and φυγή are basic ways of being moved for ψυχή, for being-there. Insofar as νοῦς is the possibility of orientation of being-there thus determined, it is a διά. Every “going-toward . . .” as δίωξις is going toward something as something. The world, insofar as it is primarily encountered for the disposition of gladness, or alternatively, being-toneddown, is there as conducive, as opposed to harmful insofar as αἰσθάνεσθαι is characterized as “perceiving” in disposition. ὅταν δὲ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, οἷον καταφᾶσα ἢ ἀποφᾶσα, διώκει ἢ φεύγει.⁸ Mere naming or calling is not the way in which everyday, average perceiving is fulfilled. Perceiving, as a mode of disposition, is the perceiving of something as something; addressing is not a simple naming or calling, but addressing as something, κατά and ἀπό. Every λόγος is characterized by κατά and ἀπό: every λόγος is σύνθεσις or διαίρεσις; every λέγειν is λέγειν τι κατά τινος. Therefore, λόγος is, at the same time, the positive possibility of error. Only because speaking is addressing something as something, is there the possibility of seeing the addressed as other than it is. The ‘as something,’ σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις, is the possibility of ψεῦδος.⁹ If orienting-oneself were a simple having-there and giving-back-in-the-sameway, there would be no ψεῦδος in the being-there of human beings. Addressing as something, διά, the fragmenting of that which is simply had into its possible determinations as this or that—this fact of the matter is originally given with the basic determination of being, ἡδονή. That is, being-there is in itself, and in its everydayness, concretely fallen into error and into the possibility of error.

Since this possibility of error exists, the fall from the genuine possibility of exhibiting and having-there of beings, and insofar as living is in turn determined by προαίρεσις, living can positively grasp the possibility of determining the being that is there in the way that it is. This διανοεῖσθαι as λέγειν τι κατά τινος can be fulfilled so that it becomes a λέγειν καθ’ αὐτό in adapting to that which is genuinely present, to that which is posited in the right regard, and so that the λόγος that unconcealedly yields beings in their being, the concept, springs from it.

The structure in which the consideration moves is that the conceptual,

8. De an. Γ 7, 431 a 9 sq.

9. De an. Γ 6, 430 b 1 sq.: τὸ γὰρ ψεῦδος ἐν συνθέσει ἀεί.