that, in fact, the aspect of the ‘usable for . . .’, on the basis of which it is referred to something, this ‘to . . . for . . .’ of beings, whose being the categories express, is constitutive; and that, on account of this, because the being-determination of ‘from . . . to . . .’ lies in the being-there of the world, in this being lies the possibility of being altered, of passing over from this to that, of changing.62
e) Movement as the Being of Beings of the World Itself: Critique of the Platonic Discourse on the ἀγαθὸν καθόλου (Nicomachean Ethics Α 4)
Since, accordingly, the ἀγαθόν itself, as πέρας of πρᾶξις, characterizes the being of the world as being-there thus and so at each moment, the discourse of an ἀγαθὸν καθόλου, of a “good in general,” makes no sense. Not only does ἀγαθόν not mean something like “value” (if one understands its genuine sense, it cannot mean an ideal way of being of values and value-contexts) but rather a particular mode of the being-there of those beings with which we have to do in πρᾶξις, oriented to the καιρός. Thus it is self-evident that, in the discussion of the ἀγαθὸν καθόλου in the Nicomachean Ethics (critique of Plato), Aristotle refers to the categories.63 Since the ἀγαθόν is being-determination of the surrounding world, the mode of being of the world that primarily characterizes it, the categories must be brought into play, insofar as the being-character of the ἀγαθόν is to be clarified now. With an appeal to the categories, Aristotle says: there is no ἀγαθὸν καθόλου; ἀγαθόν is what it is always as πρακτόν.64 The πρακτόν is characterized through the categories of τόδε τι, of ποσόν, of πρός τι as χρήσιμον,65 in relation to time as καιρός.66 There is no good that hovers over being, insofar as ‘good’ is the determination of the world’s being-there, the world with which I have to do. The ἀγαθὸν καθόλου would, accordingly, be a good that has no being at all.
Thus Aristotle shows, in Book 1, Chapter 4 of the Nicomachean Ethics, that there is no good in general, insofar as ἀγαθόν is πέρας, and πέρας is πέρας of πρᾶξις, and πρᾶξις is always ‘this here’ as at each moment. Also, the ἀγαθὸν καθ’ αὑτό, which does not have the character of conduciveness, the “good in itself” at which we stop, is not to be understood as ἀγαθὸν καθόλου.67 Here, Aristotle raises an objection against himself. That is, one could say: there is no ἀγαθὸν καθόλου insofar as the συμφέροντα come into consideration. But perhaps it is different in the case of the ἀγαθὰ καθ’ αὑτά. For example, φρονεῖν, ὁρᾶν, ἡδοναί τινες, τιμαί,68 are the sorts of things that we put under our care for their own sakes. Aristotle, for his part, poses the question: if there, in fact, being
62. See Hs. p. 367 ff.
63. Cf. Eth. Nic. Α 4, 1096 a 11 sqq.
64. Eth. Nic. Α 4, 1096 b 34.
65. Eth. Nic. Α 4, 1096 a 26.
66. Eth. Nic. Α 4, 1096 a 26 sq.
67. Cf. Eth. Nic. Α 4, 1096 b 8 sqq.
68. Eth. Nic. Α 4, 1096 b 17 sq.