that nothing is accomplished. It depends on taking the categories themselves as indicating, and taking the indicated phenomenon from out of itself into the genuineness of its being. Beings like tables and chairs stand under the category of τόδε τι. With this, it is not yet said that ψυχή would have the same being as the being of the table.
These categories should now yield a clue for the further characteristic of κίνησις, specifically in the particular sense that four of the categories determine the number of possible movements. That means: there are only movements in relation to the τόδε τι, to the ποιόν, to the ποσόν and the κατὰ τόπον. Thus Aristotle says: μεταβάλλει γὰρ τὸ μεταβάλλον ἀεὶ ἢ κατ’ οὐσίαν ἢ κατὰ ποσόν ἢ ποιόν ἢ κατὰ τόπον.80 This establishing is not at all arbitrary, but Aristotle grounds this number of different ways of movement in Physics Ε, Chapter 1.81 He grounds it by referring to ἐπαγωγή.82 One cannot deduce the various ways of being-moved through ἀπόδειξις, but must hold to the being-there of the world.
I will go directly over to the wider determination: ὥστ’ οὐδὲ κίνησις οὐδὲ μεταβολὴ οὐθενὸς ἔσται παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα, μηδενός γε ὄντος παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα.83 Next semester, we will try to see what legitimate motive lies in this fixing of the being of the Idea for Plato, and what he had in mind in this regard.84 One can only survey that backwards from Aristotle. Plato inquires into that which Aristotle has answered.85
f) The διχῶς of the Categories
Every one of the categories ὑπάρχει διχῶς,86 “is there in a twofold manner”: the being of the categories, every category as a mode of being-there of the world, of encountering the world, intends, contains in itself a διχῶς: τὸ μὲν γὰρ μορφὴ αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ στέρησις.87 A being that is there, that I characterize in its being as this there, as encountering me in itself, this has a διχῶς in itself. As thus a being that is there, it is determined as εἶδος; it appears thus and so. But it can also be, and is at the same time characterized by, στέρησις, by an “absence”: a being-present of something of whose presence an absence is constitutive, absence in the sense of deficiency, of lack. This being-there in the sense of lack is completely peculiar and positive. If I say of a human being: “I miss him very much, he is not there,” I, precisely, do not say that he is not at hand, but assert a completely determinate way of his being-there for me.” Most things, insofar
80. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 33 sq.
81. Phys. Ε 1, 224 b 35 sqq.
82. Phys. Ε 1, 224 b 30.
83. Phys. Γ 1, 201 a 1 sqq.
84. M. Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes, Marburg Lecture Course, Winter Semester 1924–25. Gesamtausgabe Volume 19, edited by I. Schüßler. Frankfurt am Main. 1992.
85. See Hs. S. 374 ff.
86. Phys. Γ 1, 201 a 3 sq.: ἕκαστον δὲ διχῶς ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν.
87. Phys. Γ 1, 201 a 4 sq.