as they are there, are never fully there for me, but are always characterized by absence, by not-being-thus as they genuinely could and should be. The being of the being-there of the world maintains itself in the ‘more or less;’ things are more or less like this or like that. In relation to the ποιόν: λευκόν and μέλαν.88 As colored, things are not purely white and purely black; instead, the genuine there is light and dark, the averageness that is not in the genuine degrees, but maintains itself between the degrees. This determination of διχῶς belongs to the basic categories themselves. This possibility is itself fundamental for movement. With this, we see not only that the categories must be understood on the basis of being-the-surrounding-world, but that, at the same time, a being, insofar as it is determined as this διχῶς, shows in itself being-possibility, to be something that is ‘from ... toward ...’ Since it is the possibility of the ‘from ... toward ...’ of something like a change, it can be in movement.
Since Aristotle emphasizes that this important point in the preparation of the definition of movement, that in the categories themselves, in accordance with their structure, a doubling is meant, it becomes visible that beings themselves are grasped in their ability-to-be as ‘from ... toward ...’; and in accordance with the four possibilities of τόδε τι, ποιόν, ποσόν, and κατὰ τόπον. Aristotle explicates this ‘from ... toward ...’ in Book 5, Chapter 1: being of the ὑποκείμενον, not in the sense of metaphysical ontology, but ὑποκείμενον is that which becomes visible in assertion, not “substance”; being of the ὑποκείμενον is obtained from the λόγος: the δηλούμενον in κατάφασις.89 It can convert a ὑποκείμενον into a non-ὑποκείμενον, and vice versa.90
g) The First Definition of Movement and Its Illustration
Aristotle takes up the concluding consideration of the fundamental beingdetermination in preparing for the definition of κίνησις in 201 a 9. He has recourse to the first determination, that a being as being-there is there in such a way that it can be something. A piece of wood can also be a chest. Aristotle has recourse to this determination when he says: διῃρημένου δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστον γένος τοῦ μὲν ἐντελεχείᾳ, τοῦ δὲ δυνάμει, ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια, ᾗ τοιοῦτον, κίνησίς ἐστιν.91 He thereby brings the consideration into the right position: the making-present of a being that is at hand characterized as beingable-to-be-something, being apprehended as the being-there of the world. Being-there: (1) as presently there, (2) in the sense of being-from-out-of ... The determination of the τέλειον comprises both aspects of being within it: there and being-from-out-of ...
In this being-there itself, as presence, there lies an aspect about which we have kept silent so far, but which jumps out at us: being-there means being-there-now.
88. Phys. Γ 1, 201 a 5 sq.
89. Phys. Ε 1, 225 a 6 sq.: λέγω δὲ ὑποκείμενον τὸ καταφάσει δηλούμενον.
90. Phys. Ε 1, 225 a 3 sqq.—See Hs. p. 376 f.
91. Phys. Γ 1, 201 a 9 sqq.