How the context is to be apprehended with respect to the dual respects of ποίησις and πάθησις, and this despite the fact that one movement is there, Aristotle demonstrates in the case of διάστασις: it is, as the so-far as such, from Thebes to Athens and from Athens to Thebes, the same.138 The being-distant, determined as such, can be taken by me as such, nonetheless, in a dual respect: I can go from Thebes to Athens and from Athens to Thebes. Both respects underlie the being-equally-far-in-distance: διάστασις μία139—διάστασις a something doubled. Κίνησις as one is the primary thing that I can apprehend in the dual respect of ποίησις and πάθησις.
This Aristotelian investigation into movement has a fundamental significance for the whole ontology: basic determination of beings as ἐνέργεια, ἐντελέχεια, and δύναμις.
Concept-formation is a matter of characterizing determinate concepts. The primary thing is to determine the respects according to fundamental characters. Every concept formation is, insofar as it is genuine, distinguished by the fact that, in the cultivation of the concept, it opens up anew the subject-matter in the fundamental character of its being. Genuinely productive concept-formation lies in the opening up of the concrete character of the subject-matter, so that the entire conceptuality of the region of being becomes visible, not only in such a way that touches on the matter, but also the how.
The question concerning the τί τὸ ὄν is derived from the determinateness of ποίησις and being-there-present—ποίησις as primary being-in-the-world, πρᾶξις. It gives rise to, as well as the closest view of, Greek ontology—not the ontology of nature! The later history of philosophy neglects to look toward being-in-the-world. The discovery of ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια takes seriously what Plato and Parmenides wanted. What counts is not to say something new, but to say what the ancients already intended.140
138. Cf. Phys. Γ 3, 202 a 18 sqq., b 13 sq.
139. Phys. Γ 3, 202 b 17 sq.
140. See Hs. p. 392 ff.