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Preserved Parts of the Handwritten Manuscript [337–339]

2. speaking, addressing, discussing, self-expressing: λόγος, κατηγορίαι;

3. context: fourfoldness of the ὂν

—leading back to being-there!

This preparation on the path of a presentative orientation. Topic: being as being-there, “there,” being the origin of being—neither logic nor ontology, hermeneutics? Pursuing in the concrete: what beings in their being mean; how expressed in which conceptuality.

Ποίησις, κίνησις, δύναμις, ἐνέργεια: being-produced.

Εἶδος, οὐσία: being-there. Cf. p. 337ff.


On §4


Some Aristotelian basic concepts in their conceptuality: Why not simply “basic concepts”? Why the addition, “in their conceptuality”?

Concept: notio, intentio, conceptus, species. Taken roughly, the concept says what a matter is, what one understands by it, which meaning one has of something. E.g., the concept κίνησις, “movement,” μεταβολή, “change”: if we are hearing-out in the text, we shall thereby experience which apprehension Aristotle has of movement, what movement is in his sense. However, we do not want to interrogate Aristotle about which apprehension he has of certain objects in order to distinguish it from later or modern apprehensions and obtain a knowledge of Aristotelian philosophy.

Conceptuality:

We want to understand such concepts in their conceptuality, i.e.

1. We are examining what the matter indicated in the concept is originally experienced as. And what did Aristotle have in view in terms of the thing moved, if he is seeking to apprehend the phenomenon of movement in it? Which sense of being is meant with the experience of a being-that-is-moved? Which being provides its look?

2. We are asking: what does Aristotle perceive in the phenomenon of movement thus presented? In relation to what is he addressing it? Is he seeking to clarify it on the basis of fixed concepts already at hand—transition from notbeing to being—or does he take from the phenomenon presented to him, the originally understood matter itself, that which he understands by it. Does he set it free for the address?

3. [Which address is posited in the determination of the thing secured in this way, i.e., for what sort of address is the understanding sufficient? Is the address of the matter in its intelligibility, corresponding to the dealing with it, appropriate or is it held out as something foreign, fantastical, to it? (Mathematical definition of ethical concepts)]11


11. Editor’s note: Deleted in the handwritten notes.


Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy (GA 18) by Martin Heidegger

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