3. For which type of intelligibility and determinateness is the unwrapping of the phenomenon sufficient? Does the intelligibility striven for emerge from the concrete character of the matter and the legitimate dealing with it (use!), and is it measured by it? Or is it guided by a fantastical idea of intelligibility, determinateness? In which interpretedness is the thing that is seen and addressed discussed? (Mathematical definition of ethical concepts, natural-scientific definition of historical concepts, philosophical definition of theological concepts.)
These three aspects are not exhaustive, but they do indicate what is meant by conceptuality:
1. concretely giving basic experience,
2. the occurring guiding claim (toward-what),
3. character of the prevailing intelligibility, tendency and determinateness.
Basic concepts in their conceptuality—that means, then, conducting inquiry with the concepts at the moment according to these aspects. Whether the matters intended are properly understood only in this particular and genuine way is something that can be shown only by carrying it out. Conceptuality is emphasized explicitly because it is what should matter to you. Not so that you take notice of it and, alongside the conceptual content, also know some information about its conceptuality, but rather that you so to speak feel how, in what was indicated roughly as conceptuality according to some of its aspects, nothing else is stirred up but the fulfillment of scientific research in its substance. That means, however, that you yourselves have to execute the decisive work: becoming attentive, for your part and in the place where you have located yourselves in a scientific discipline by a free decision, to what occurs with the conceptuality at the moment. A precondition for being-able-to-become-attentive is that one stands within the matter. Therefore, not in such a way that you speculate about concepts now for a semester and say to yourselves, “Yes, first of all I have to know what philology is, then I can start.” That guy will never reach the starting-point, because he will never come to know what philology is. By no means is it to take over Aristotelian concepts and apply them—it’s not repeating his talk, but doing what he does! I myself have nothing to do with it but to take care that Aristotle be given the opportunity to put before you his matter.
Aristotelian basic concepts in their conceptuality: κίνησις, δύναμις, ἐνέργεια, ἀλήθεια, λόγος, and so on—we are thus to question them according to the aspects discussed. That requires a dual precaution:
1. that we understand wherein these aspects of conceptuality belong, where conceptuality is indigenous, what and how it is then as such;
2. we are to understand Aristotelian concepts in their, i.e., Aristotelian, Greek, conceptuality—therefore, to have the Greek indigenous character of conceptuality come into view.