with itself) in terms of which the beings had in the fore-having are viewed and questioned. Being-there already maintains itself, in each case, in this looking-out, already operates in this “sight”: look, being-produced—implicitly (dealings, concernful—looking that deals with). The fore-having is already set within a definite fore-sight.
3) The prevailing intelligibility. The fore-having that is already there is, as set in the fore-sight that pertains to it, explicated in accordance with a prevailing type to foreground the being-determinations of beings in this way, the concrete as-what determinations. Fore-having and fore-sight are controlled by a determinate call to interpretation, a determinate extent of evidence, a determinate type of showing and of proof (rigor): fore-grasp.
Fore-having, fore-sight, fore-grasp constitute the interpretedness of beingthere, which pervades the particular being-there, being-with-one-another, and which directs interpretations in an average way. Conceptuality is initially there as this interpretedness. The fore = already there from the outset, i.e., in relation to being-there: in accordance with its being, governed by . . . being-in means to be determined by this fore-character of having, sight, and grasp. Being-there: to be in interpretedness that already prevails.
The being of this prevalence lies in λόγος, and being-there for itself in its initial and familiar character is presented in λόγος. Thereby, a phenomenon that is already given should become more perspicuously evident afterwards. That which is spoken: sentences, words, expressed and communicated, in circulation, repeated. In opinion, again to discuss that which is discussed without recourse to what is said, to what is spoken further, λόγος can conceal and dissimulate, precisely, beings. That means: speaking, as operating communicating in interpretedness is implicit and unintentional dissimulating, as communicating dissimulating asserting about . . . , i.e., mis-leading. Therein lies the possibility of deception, of deceiving and being-deceived, and further of the false. Being-there, as determined in this way by λόγος and in the fore-character of its interpretedness, is itself the possibility, in accordance with its being, of error and of the erroneous, and furthermore of the false and of lies (see WS 23/24: being-erroneous).60 The same connection of λόγος-εἶδος is the ground of the expression “false gold”—“false” of a being in the world. False: therein the look: to look like . . . and yet to be, look as seeming.
Prevalence of λόγος: see Parmenides. Curiosity: to be let loose in this prevalence, its support. Prevalence of λόγος in relation to the tradition of words, word-meanings. Κληρονομία ὀνόματος, said of ἡδονή—basic concept of the interpretation of being-there: that which it means, originally bears in itself, “heritage,” to seize hold of, specifically σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ εἰλήφασιν.61 What is initial and most familiar in everydayness seizes hold of the interpretation
60. Cf. M. Heidegger, Introduction to Phenomenological Research, GA 17: 31ff.
61. Eth. Nic. Η 14, 1153 b 33 sq.: εἰλήφασι τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος ἁι σωματικαὶ ἡδοναί.