by ἑτερότης in relation to oxen, but to this extent is not moved. 10 is “not equal” to 5, ἄνισα, but is not therefore in movement.
Certainly, a representative of opinion could say, ἑτερότης is not meant in that way, but instead “being-otherwise” is to be understood as determination of beings themselves that are in movement; not in relation to others, “beingotherwise” is in itself. But what is characterized by a manifoldness of aspects, or even is both δυνάμει and ἐνεργείᾳ, is not in movement. Wood can be a chest and is there as wood—determined in itself by ἑτερότης—and nevertheless not be determined as moved.
But perhaps ἑτερότης is understood as ἑτεροίωσις, “becoming-otherwise.” But then, surely, movement is defined by movement. (ἑτεροίωσις is ἀλλοίωσις, ἕτερον—ἄλλο).
As long as κίνησις is not understood on the basis of presence as a mode thereof, it cannot be apprehended ontologically.
Already that which is characteristic of μὴ ὄν is approaching, insofar as it is taken as simply-and-generally-not-being-there, but as something that is not yet determined, in terms of which possibility is constituted. And yet not sufficiently, since a determination κατὰ συμβεβηκός is not what that which is moved always is in itself, the how of its there, being-present, but instead on the basis of the relation to another. Every being is something, and it is not many others. All that is in movement must be in movement by way of this not-being.
On §27c
What is determined in its being through being-otherwise, inequality, not-being is determined as a being in movement. It must not, therefore, be named a moved being. On the other hand, to explicate movement in this way determines it as how of a being, which is seen in this determination, and is seen as a moved being.
Why these ἀρχαί? Where is the motive for this categorial apprehension, and particularly of the static? Movement as immovability? What is meant phenomenally by συνεχές?156 That which is static seems to pertain to that determination of this phenomenon. None of these [ἀρχαί]157 determine a being in the sense that the categories do (instead, they are only formal-ontological determinations), and κίνησις is not a determinate being with concrete content (fundamental objection to Plato). Therefore, one can address being-moved as moved: participating in the movement, one can want to determine this on the basis of κοινωνία, and yet miss everything! By contrast, in Aristotle, the categories are the guiding clue of the analysis of the being of beings that are moved, i.e.,
156. Cf. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 16 sq.: δοκεῖ δ’ ἡ κίνησις εἶναι τῶν συνεχῶν.
157. Editor’s note.