themselves are always in a ‘from . . . to . . . ,’ appearing and so not-lookingthus, being-absent of something, the character of the average.
Until now, an equally preparatory, broader determination of beings that is connected to the naming of the categories has not been discussed, the πρός τι.184 The πρός τι is itself a category that reveals the world that is there in the encounter-character of the ‘in relation to,’ i.e., of the [from]185 one to another. To the four categories οὐσία, ποιόν, ποσόν, τόπος correspond the four εἴδη of κίνησις: γένεσις—φθορά, ἀλλοίωσις, αὔξησις—φθίσις, φορά.186 There are no other kinds of movement. The explicit lead of the πρός τι in the ontological preparation of the definition of movement must, accordingly, have another sense: not a pre-figuring of the type of encounter of the world in relation to a determinate mode of movement, but in relation to every being that is in movement. The lead of this category should reveal the basic fact of the matter: beings of the world encountered as manifoldness of beings as beings that are “in relations to each other,” πρός ἄλληλα. Insofar as beings are ever in διχῶς, they are also in themselves in relation to each other in the ‘more than that and less.’ The degrees are there as how in the being-in-relations of beings. Cf. Categories 7. Ὑπεροχή [and]187 ἔλλειψις are possible determinations of the πρός τι,188 which lies at their ground. Along with ὑπεροχή and ἔλλειψις, Aristotle names ποίησις and πάθησις,189 “having to do with . . . ,” “having something matter to . . . ,” (“Reciprocation”), as such basic concepts.
This relation is found in the world, more precisely: beings as always this here and now are encountered in it, beings as beings at hand, beings that occur and are encountered in this way, but in a specific type of being of presence-athand-in-the-world—the initial, indifference.
Earlier, we referred to the fact that human beings are at hand and encountered in the world, we ourselves are at hand, human beings that manipulate, busy themselves with . . . , living things, animals. This busying-oneself-with . . . , being in such relations, is equally familiar to us whether as occurrences in the world or as the mode of our being-there that is not merely being-at-hand, but instead in the basic mode of being-in-the-world.
The πρός ἄλληλα (cf. De Partibus Animalium and De Anima) still possesses this distinctive possibility of the πρός τι: in the sense of the ἀντικείμενον,190 so that this genuine ἀντί is: the to-which of being-related in person, i.e., to show oneself, showing in the mode of being-uncovered, there in discoveredness,
184. Cf. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 28—32.
185. Editor’s note.
186. Phys. Γ 1, 201 a 12 sqq.
187. Editor’s note.
188. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 28 sq.: τοῦ δὲ πρός τι τὸ μὲν καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν λέγεται καὶ κατ’ ἔλλειψιν.
189. Phys. Γ 1, 200 b 29 sq.: τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ παθητικόν.
190. Cat. 10, 11 b 32 sqq.: Ὅσα οὖν ἀντίκειται ὡς τὰ πρός τι, αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων λέγεται ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε πρὸς ἄλληλα λέγεται.