further to think that this thing is [exists] makes not the least addition to the thing [that is, to the res]. For, otherwise, what would exist would be not exactly the same but more than I had thought in the concept, and I could not say that the exact object of my concept exists."14
On the other hand, the fact nevertheless remains that this "exists"—a thing exists—occurs as a predicate in common linguistic usage.15 What is more, the expression "is" in the broadest sense is involved in every predication, even when I do not posit as existent that about which I am judging and predicating, even when 1 merely say "Body, by its very nature, is ex-tended"—whether a body exists or not. Here I am also using an "is," the "is," in the sense of the copula, which is distinct from the "is" when I say "God is," that is, "God exists." Being as copula, as linking concept, and being in the sense of existence must consequently be distinguished.
How does Kant explain this distinction? If being or existence is not a real predicate, then how can being be determined positively and how does the concept of existence, of extantness, differ from the concept of being in general? Kant says: "The concept of position is utterly simple and is one and the same as the concept of being. Now something can be thought as posited merely relatively, or, better, we can think merely the relation (respectus logicus) of something as a mark to a thing, and then being, that is, the position of this relation ["A is B"], is nothing but the combining concept in a judgment. If what is had in view is not merely this relation [ that is, if being and "is" are used not merely in the sense of the copula, "A is B"] but instead the thing as posited in and for itself, then this being is tantamount to existence [that is, Vorhandensein]."16 Existence "is thereby also distinguished from every predicate, which qua predicate is always posited merely relatively to another thing."17 Being in general is one and the same as position in general. In this sense Kant speaks of the mere positions (realities) of a thing, which constitute its concept, that is, its possibility, and which must not be mutually contradictory, since the principle of contradiction (non-contradiction) is the criterion oflogical possibilities.18 By its very concept, every predicate is always posited merely relatively. When, on the other hand, I say "Something exists," in this positing I am not making a relational reference to any other thing or to some other characteristic of a thing, to some other real being; instead, I am here positing the thing in and for itself, free of relation; I am positing here without relation, non-relatively,
14. Ibid., B628.
15. Beweisgrund, p. 76.
16. Ibid., p. 77.
17. Ibid.
18. Critique of Pure Reason, B630.