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its understanding of being, there is present a peculiar character of discharge and release as concerns that to which this behavior comports itself. Correspondingly, producedness (actuality as effectedness) includes within itself, to be sure, a reference to the producing Dasein; but this reference, corresponding to its own ontological sense, understands the product as released for its own self and thus as being in itself. Something like this intentionality of producing, which we have characterized, and the type of understanding of being peculiar to it should be seen simply with a vision that has not been dazzled and made squint-eyed by some current theory of knowledge. No matter how logically rigorous concepts may be, if they are blind then they are worthless. To see something like such an intentional structure of production and interpret it in one's analysis without prepossession, to make it accessible and keep hold of it and adapt one's concept-formation to what is thus held fast and seen—this is the sober sense of the much ventilated so-called phenomenological Wesensschau. Anyone who gets his information about phenomenology from newspapers and weekly reviews must let himself be talked into the notion that phenomenology is something like a mysticism, something like the "logic of the Indian contemplating his navel." This is not just a matter to be laughed at; it is actually current among people who wish to be taken in scientific earnest.
The thing to see is this. In the intentional structure of production there is implicit reference to something, by which this something is understood as not bound to or dependent on the subject but, inversely, as released and independent. In terms of fundamental principle, we encounter here an extremely peculiar transcendence of the Dasein, which we shall consider later in more detail and which, as will appear, is possible only on the basis of temporality.
This noteworthy character of the release of the thing to be produced in productive comportment has not, however, been interpreted completely by what has been said. The thing to be produced is not understood in productive action as something which, as product in general, is supposed to be extant {at hand] in itself. Rather, in accordance with the productive intention implicit in it, it is already apprehended as something that, qua finished, is available at any time for use. It is intended in productive action not simply as something somehow put aside but as something put here, here in the Dasein's sphere, which does not necessarily have to coincide with the producer's own sphere. It can be the sphere of the user, which itself stands in an inner essential connection with that of the producer.
What we are trying to bring to light here by means of phenomenological analysis in regard to the intentional structure of production is not contrived and fabricated but already present in the everyday, pre-philosophical productive behavior of the Dasein. In producing, the Dasein lives in such an