thinking myself can be my own object (of intuition) and thus can differentiate myself from myself. However it points to a faculty elevated so far above all sense intuitions that, as the ground of possibility of an understanding, it has as its consequence our complete separation from every beast, to which we have no reason to ascribe the capacity to say T to itself, and it looks beyond to an infinity of self-made representations and concepts [the ontological ones]. What is intended by this, however, is not a double personality; only I who think and intuit am the person, whereas the ego of the object that is intuited by me is, like other objects outside me, the thing [Sache]."9 That the ego of transcendental apperception is logical, the subject of the "I combine," does not signify that it is a different ego compared with the actual, existent psychical ego; it does not even mean that it is not at all anything that is. Only this much is asserted, that the being of this ego is problematic; according to Kant it is in general indeterminable, and in any case in principle not capable of determination by means of psychology. The personalitas psychologica presupposes the personalitas transcendentalis.
γ) Personalitas moralis
But the true and central characterization of the ego, of subjectivity, in Kant is not yet gained by describing the ego as personalitas transcendentalis and personalitas psychologica, subject-ego and object-ego. It lies in the concept of personalitas moralis. According to Kant, man's personality, the constitution of his being a person, is exhausted neither by the personalitas psychologica, which is the ground of animality, nor by the personalitas transcendentalis, which characterizes man's rationality in general, nor by both together. This is indicated by a passage from Kant's work Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. In book 1, section 1, entitled "Concerning the Original Predisposition to Good in Human Nature," Kant enumerates three elements of man's determination: animateness, humanity, and personality. 10 The first determination, animateness, distinguishes man as a living being in general; the second determination, humanity, as a living and at the same time a rational being; the third determination, personality, as a rational being and at the same time a responsible, accountable being. When he speaks of personality as the third element in distinction from humanity as the second, it is apparent that personality is meant here in a narrower sense contrasted with personalitas transcendentalis, which is identical with
9. Ibid., pp. 248-249.
10. Kant, Werke (Cassirer), vol. 6, p. 164, [Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (New York, Evanston and London: Harper and Row, 1960), pp. 21-23.]