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humanity. To the complete concept of personalitas belongs not only rationality but also responsibility. Consequently, personality has a twofold meaning for Kant: first, the broad formal concept of egohood in general in the sense of self-consciousness, whether the transcendental I-think or the empirical object-ego; and, secondly, the narrower and proper concept which in a certain way includes the other two meanings, or what they mean, but has its center in the determination we now have to consider. Personality proper is personalitas moralis. If the formal structure of personalitas in general lies in self-consciousness, then the personalitas moralis must express a specific modification of self-consciousness and thus it must represent a peculiar kind of self-consciousness. It is this moral self-consciousness that really characterizes the person in regard to what that personality is. How does Kant elucidate moral self-consciousness? What does the human being know himself to be insofar as he understands himself morally, as an acting being? What does he then understand himself to be and of what nature is this moral self-knowledge? Obviously, moral self-knowledge cannot coincide with the types of self-consciousness discussed previously, either empirical or transcendental. Above all, moral self-consciousness cannot be the empirical knowledge and experience of a factual state simply extant; it cannot be an empirical—which always means for Kant a sensible—self-consciousness, one mediated by inner or outer sense. Moral self-consciousness, especially if it concerns personalitas in the strict and proper sense, will be man's true being as a mental being [Geistigkeit] and will not be mediated by sense-experience. According to Kant there pertains to sensibility in the broader sense not only the faculty of sensation but also the faculty he commonly designates as the feeling of pleasure and unpleasure, or delight in the agreeable, or the reverse. Pleasure in the widest sense is not only desire for something and pleasure in something but always also, as we may say, enjoyment; this is a way in which the human being, turning with pleasure toward something, experiences himself as enjoying—he is joyous.

We must elucidate this state of affairs phenomenologically. It pertains in general to the essential nature of feeling not only that it is feeling for something but also that this feeling for something at the same time makes feelable the feeler himself and his state, his being in the broadest sense. Conceived in formally universal terms, feeling expresses for Kant a peculiar mode of revelation of the ego. In having a feeling for something there is always present at the same time a self-feeling, and in this self-feeling a mode of becoming revealed to oneself. The manner in which I become manifest to myself in feeling is determined in part by that for which I have a feeling in this feeling. Thus it appears that feeling is not a simple reflection upon oneself but rather a feeling of self in having a feeling for something. This is a structure already somewhat complex but intrinsically unitary. The essential