for, pointing to a for-which. The specific structure of equipment is constituted by a contexture of the what-for, in-order-to. Each particular equipmental thing has as such a specific reference to another particular equipmental thing. We can formulate this reference even more clearly. Every entity that we uncover as equipment has with it a specific functionality, Bewandtnis [an in-order-to-ness, a way of being functionally deployed]. The contexture of the what-for or in-order-to is a whole of functionality relations. This functionality which each entity carries with it within the whole functionality complex is not a property adhering to the thing, and it is also not a relation which the thing has only on account of the extant presence of another entity. Rather, the functionality that goes with chair, blackboard, window is exactly that which makes the thing what it is. The functionality contexture is not a relational whole in the sense of a product that emerges only from the conjoint occurrence of a number of things. The functionality whole, narrower or broader—room, house, neighborhood, town, city—is the prius, within which specific beings, as beings of this or that character, are as they are and exhibit themselves correspondingly. If we are actually thinking the wall, what is already given beforehand, even if not apprehended thematically, is living room, drawing room, house. A specific functionality whole is pre-understood. What we here explicitly and firstly attend to or even apprehend and observe in the equipmental contexture which in the given instance surrounds us most closely is not determinable but always optional and variable within certain limits. Existing in an environment, we dwell in such an intelligible functionality whole. We make our way throughout it. As we exist factically we are always already in an environing world [Umwelt, milieu] The being that we ourselves are is not also present in the lecture hall here, say, like the seats, desks, and blackboards, merely with the difference that the being that we ourselves are knows about the relation it has to other things, say, to the window and the bench. The difference is not just that things like the chair and bench are juxtaposed to each other, whereas in contrast the Dasein, in being juxtaposed with the wall, also knows about its juxtaposition. This distinction between knowing and not knowing is inadequate to fix in a clear, unequivocal ontological manner the essentially different way in which extant things are extant together and in which a Dasein comports itself toward things extant. The Dasein is not also extant among things with the difference merely that it apprehends them. Instead, the Dasein exists in the manner of being-in-the-world, and this basic determination of its existence is the presupposition for being able to apprehend anything at all. By hyphenating the term we mean to indicate that this structure is a unitary one.
But what are surrounding world and world? The surrounding world is different in a certain way for each of us, and notwithstanding that we move about in a common world. But not much has been said in making this