Thesis of Modern Ontology [238-240]

the world that forces us to a more radical formulation of the subject concept. We shall learn to understand that that is how matters stand. But we shall also not conceal from ourselves the fact that for this purpose it is less acuteness that is required than freedom from bias.

The world is something "subjective," presupposing that we correspondingly define subjectivity with regard to this phenomenon of world. To say that the world is subjective is to say that it belongs to the Dasein so far as this being is in the mode of being-in-the-world. The world is something which the "subject" "projects outward," as it were, from within itself. But are we permitted to speak here of an inner and an outer? What can this projection mean? Obviously not that the world is a piece of myself in the sense of some other thing present in me as in a thing and that I throw the world out of this subject-thing in order to catch hold of the other things with it. Instead, the Dasein itself is as such already projected. So far as the Dasein exists a world is cast-forth with the Dasein' s being. To exist means, among other things, to cast-forth a world,* and in fact in such a way that with the thrownness of this projection, with the factical existence of a Dasein, extant entities are always already uncovered. With the projection, with the forthcast world, that is unveiled from which alone an intraworldly extant entity is uncoverable. Two things are to be established: (1) being-in-the-world belongs to the concept of existence; (2) factically existent Dasein, factical being-in-the-world, is always already being-with intraworldly beings. To factical being-in-the-world there always belongs a being-with intraworldly beings. Being with things extant in the broader sense, for example, circumspective commerce with things in the more confined and the broader environment, is founded in being-in-the-world.

It is important for the first understanding of these phenomena that we should make clear to ourselves the essential difference between the two structures, the difference between being-in-the-world as a determination of the Dasein and intraworldliness, being within the world, as a possible determination of things extant. Let us try to characterize once more, by contrasting the two structures, this difference between being-in-the-world as a determination of the Dasein's ontological constitution and intraworldliness or being within the world as a possible but not necessary determination of extant entities.

An example of an intraworldly entity is nature. It is indifferent in this connection how far nature is or is not scientifically uncovered, indifferent whether we think this being in a theoretical, physico-chemical way or think

*The phrase Heidegger uses, sich Welt vorher-werfen, also suggests that the world is thrown beforehand, in advance, and not merely "forth"; it is pre-thrown, pre-cast; it is an a priori of the Dasein.

Basic Problems of Phenomenology (GA 24) by Martin Heidegger