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§15. Fundamental Problem [248-250]

monadology—principally because he embedded his genuine intuition in traditional ontology—nevertheless in this idea of the monads' representation something positive must be seen that has hitherto hardly been worked out in philosophy.

We have achieved several results:

First. Self-understanding should not be equated formally with a reflected ego-experience but varies in each case with the mode of being of the Dasein and in fact in the basic forms of authenticity and inauthenticity.

Second. Being-in-the-world belongs to the Dasein's ontological constitution; it is a structure that must be sharply distinguished from the intraworldliness, being within the world, of extant entities, since intraworldliness does not belong to the being of the extant, or in particular to that of nature, but only devolves upon it. Nature can also be without there being a world, without a Dasein existing.

Third. The being of beings which are not a Dasein has a richer and more complex structure and therefore goes beyond the usual characterization of the extant as a contexture of things.

Fourth. It emerges from a correctly conceived self-understanding of the Dasein that the analysis of self-consciousness presupposes the elucidation of the constitution of existence. Only with the aid of a radical interpretation of the subject can an ungenuine subjectivism be avoided and equally a blind realism, which would like to be more realistic than things themselves are because it misconstrues the phenomenon of the world.

Fifth. The characterization of being-in-the-world as a basic structure of the Dasein makes it clear that all comportment of the self toward intraworldly beings, or what we previously called intentional comportment toward beings, is grounded on the basic constitution of being-in-the-world. Intentionality presupposes the Dasein's specific transcendence, but this transcendence cannot be explicated by means of the concept of intentionality as it has hitherto been usually conceived.

Sixth. To intentionality, as comportment toward beings, there always belongs an understanding of the being of those beings to which the intentio refers. Henceforth it will be clear that this understanding of the being of beings is connected with the understanding of world, which is the presupposition for the experience of an intraworldly being. But, now, since world-understanding is at the same time an understanding-of-itself by the Dasein—for being-in-the-world constitutes a determination of the Dasein—the understanding of the being that belongs to intentionality embraces the Dasein's being as well as the being of intraworldly beings which are not Daseins. This means that

Seventh. This understanding of being, which embraces all beings in a certain way, is, to begin with, indifferent—we commonly say of everything