nowadays.* It is characteristic of the status of logic within the philosophy of the second half of the nineteenth century that, for example, a man of Dilthey's stature was satisfied throughout his lifetime in expounding in his lectures the most tedious academic logic warmed up a bit with psychology. In his Logical Investigations (1900-1901) Husserl was the first to bring light again to logic and its problems. But he, too, did not succeed in conceiving logic philosophically; on the contrary he even intensified the tendency to develop logic into a separate science, as a formal discipline detached from philosophy. Logic itself, from whose area of inquiry the first phenomenological investigations grew, was not able to keep step with the development of phenomenology itself. From the more recent period there are two works, self-willed and betraying a philosophical impulse, that are noteworthyEmil Lask's Die Logik der Philosophie (1911) and Die Lehre vom Urteil (1912). If Lask, too, treats things for the most part formalistically and in the conceptual schemata of Neo-Kantianism, he nevertheless consciously pushes on toward a philosophical understanding of logic and in doing so is compelled under pressure from the subject matter itself to return to the ontological problems. Still, Lask was unable to free himself from the conviction of his contemporaries that Neo-Kantianism had the vocation to renovate philosophy.
This crude sketch of the fate of logic is intended to indicate that because the problem of the copula, the "is," is treated in logic, it necessarily gets detached from the truly relevant problems of philosophy as the science of being. The problem will make no further progress as long as logic itself has not been taken back again into ontology, as long as Hegel—who, in contrast, dissolved ontology into logic—is not comprehended. And this means always that Hegel must be overcome by radicalizing the way in which the problem is put; and at the same time he must be appropriated. This overcoming of Hegel is the intrinsically necessary step in the development of Western philosophy which must be made for it to remain at all alive. Whether logic can successfully be made into philosophy again we do not know; philosophy should not prophesy, but then again it should not remain asleep.
*Christoph Sigwart (1830-1904) was a dominant figure in the field of logic in the nineteenth century in Germany. In his view. logic was to be understood and developed as a normative and methodological doctrine. His basic work in the area was Logik, 2 vols. (Tübingen, 1873-1878; 4th ed., 1911; trans., London, 1895). Wilhelm Schuppe (1836- 1913) was the chief representative of the philosophy of immanence, an anti-metaphysical position allied to empiriocriticism and positivism, He wrote mainly on ethics, philosophy of right, and logic. The two fullest treatments of logic among his writings were Erkenntnistheoretische Logik (Bonn, 1878) and Grundriss der Erkenntnistheorie und Logik (Berlin, 1894; 2nd ed. 1910).