in the tradition the original sense of the Greek understanding of truth is completely hidden.
We shall attempt to investigate in further detail the understanding of the truth phenomenon. Being-true means unveiling. We include in this the mode of uncovering as well as that of disclosure, the unveiling of the being whose being is not that of the Dasein and the unveiling of the being that we ourselves are. We take being-true in this wholly formal sense as unveiling, in which it is not yet cut to fit a specific being and its mode of being. Being-true as unveiling yields itself as a way of being of the Dasein itself, of the Dasein's existence. So far as it exists—and this means, in conformity with our earlier results, so far as it is in such a way that it is in a world—the Dasein is true; that is to say, with the unveiled world there are always already beings unveiled, disclosed, uncovered, for it. The uncovering of extant beings is founded on the circumstance that the Dasein, as existent, in each case already comports itself to a world which is disclosed. In existing, the Dasein thus understands something like its world, and with the disclosure of its world the Dasein is at the same time unveiled to its own self for itself. We have already heard that this self-disclosure of the Dasein, its self-understanding, at first gained factically, is appropriated on the path of self-understanding by way of things that are in some sense uncovered and with which the Dasein dwells as itself existing. Because this disclosure of itself, and in unity with it the uncoveredness of intraworldly beings, belongs to the essential nature of the Dasein, we can say that the Dasein exists in truth, that is, in the unveiledness of itself and of the beings to which it comports itself. Only because as existing it is essentially already in truth can it err as such, and only for that same reason is there concealment, pretense, and taciturn reserve.
Being-true is unveiling, unveiling is a comportment of the ego, and therefore, it is said, being-true is something subjective. We reply, "subjective" no doubt, but in the sense of the well-understood concept of the "subject," as existing Dasein, the Dasein as being in the world. We can now understand in what way the Aristotelian thesis that being-true does not occur in things but ἐν διανοίᾳ, in the understanding, is valid. But we can also see in what way it is invalid. If understanding and thinking are taken as a psychical understanding of an extant mind, then the presumed meaning of the assertion that truth occurs in the sphere of the subject remains unintelligible. But if, on the contrary, διάνοια, intellect, understanding, is taken in the way this phenomenon must be taken, in its apophantic structure, as the unveiling exhibiting of something, then it becomes clear that understanding as unveiling exhibiting of something is determined intrinsically in its structure by being-true as unveiling. Thinking, as a free comportment of the human being, is situated in the possibility, as unveiling,