§18. Idea of Truth and Concept of Being [309-310]

to meet suitably or to miss the entity that is given to it. The being-true of assertion lies in its structure, because assertion is intrinsically a comportment of the Dasein, and the Dasein, as existing, is determined by being-true.

b) The intentional structure of unveiling. The existential mode of being of truth. Unveiledness as determination of the being of a being

Since the Dasein exists as being-in-the-world, it is always already dwelling with some being. "With some being" we say-that is, this being is unveiled in some sense or other. To the Dasein as unveiling there belongs essentially something unveiled in its unveiledness, some entity to which the unveiling relates in conformity with its intentional structure. There belongs to unveiling, as to every other intentional comportment, an understanding of the being of that to which this comportment relates as such. In unveiling assertion the Dasein is directed toward something which it understands beforehand in that entity's unveiledness. The intentum of the intentio of unveiling assertion has the character of unveiledness. If we equate being-true with unveiling, ἀληθεύειν with δηλοῦν, and if unveiling is essentially, not accidentally, related in its intrinsic intentionality to something to be unveiled, then there belong to the concept of truth the moment of unveiling and the unveiledness to which, by its structure, this unveiling relates. But there is unveiledness only so far as there is an unveiling, so far as the Dasein exists. Truth and being-true as unveiledness and unveiling have the Dasein's mode of being. By its very nature, truth is never extant like a thing but exists. Thus Aristotle's thesis, when properly understood, becomes valid again in its negative part. Being-true, says Aristotle, is not something in things; it is not something extant. Nevertheless, the Aristotelian thesis requires supplementation and more precise determination. For just because truth is only so far as it exists, having the Dasein's mode of being, and because there belongs to it at the same time the unveiledness of that to which it relates, it is admittedly not anything extant; but, as the unveiledness of that to which assertion refers, it is a possible determination of the being of the extant. It is a determination of the being of the extant so far as the extant is, for example, unveiled in an unveiling assertion.

When we say that being-true does not mean something that is extant among things, this mode of speech still suffers from an ambiguity. For being-true, as the unveiling of something, means precisely, each time, this entity to which it relates; it means this extant entity in its unveiledness. Unveiledness is indeed not an extant determination of something extant,