wish to pose the basic ontological problem at all. Therefore, we have to choose an alternative and presuppose the essential result of the existential analytic of the Dasein as a result already established. In my treatise on Being and Time, I set forth what the existential analytic encompasses in its essential results. The outcome of the existential analytic, the exposition of the ontological constitution of the Dasein in its ground, is this: the constitution of the Dasein's being is grounded in temporality [Zeitlichkeit]. If we presuppose this result, it does not mean that we may permit ourselves to be satisfied just to hear the word "temporality." Without explicitly adducing here the proof that the Dasein's basic constitution is grounded in temporality, we must nevertheless attempt in some way to gain an understanding of what temporality means. To this end we choose the following path. We shall take as our starting point the common concept of time and learn to see how what is commonly known as time and was for a long time the only concept of time made into a problem in philosophy, itself presupposes temporality. The point is to see that and how time in its common sense belongs to and springs from temporality. By means of this reflection we shall work our way toward the phenomenon of temporality itself and its basic structure. What shall we gain by doing this? Nothing less than insight into the original constitution of the Dasein's being. But then, if indeed the understanding of being belongs to the Dasein's existence, this understanding too must be based in temporality. The ontological condition of the possibility of the undeTstanding of being is temporality itself. Therefore we must be able to cull from it that by way of which we understand the like of being. Temporality takes over the enabling of the understanding of being and thus the enabling of the thematic interpretation of being and of its articulation and manifold ways; it thus makes ontology possible. From this arises a whole set of specific problems related to temporality. We call this entire problematic that of Temporality [Temporalität]. The term ''Temporality" [Temporalität] does not wholly coincide with the term "temporality" [Zeitlichkeit], despite the fact that, in German, Temporalität is merely the translation of Zeitlichkeit. It means temporality insofar as temporality itself is made into a theme as the condition of the possibility of the understanding of being and of ontology as such. The term "Temporality" is intended to indicate that temporality, in existential analytic, represents the horizon from which we understand being. What we are inquiring into in existential analytic, existence, proves to be temporality, which on its part constitutes the horizon or the understanding of being that belongs essentially to the Dasein.
The main point is to sec being in its Temporal determination and to unveil its problematics. But if being becomes phenomenologically visible in its Temporal determination, we thereby put ourselves in a position to grasp the distinction between being and beings more clearly as well, and to fix the